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The advisory service marketing recommendations used in this research represent the best 
efforts of the AgMAS Project staff to accurately and fairly interpret the information made 
available by each advisory service. In cases where a recommendation is vague or unclear, some 
judgment is exercised as to whether or not to include that particular recommendation or how to 
implement the recommendation. Given that some recommendations are subject to interpretation, 
the possibility is acknowledged that the AgMAS track record of recommendations for a given 
program may differ from that stated by the advisory service, or from that recorded by another 
subscriber. In addition, the net advisory prices presented in this report may differ substantially 
from those computed by an advisory service or another subscriber due to differences in 
simulation assumptions, particularly with respect to the geographic location of production, cash 
and forward contract prices, expected and actual yields, carrying charges and government 
programs.  ii 




  The primary purpose of this research report is to present an evaluation of advisory service 
pricing performance for the 1999 corn and soybean crops.  In order to evaluate the returns to the 
marketing advice produced by the services, the AgMAS Project purchases a subscription to each 
of the programs offered by a service.  The information is received electronically via DTN, world 
wide website or e-mail.  Staff members of the AgMAS Project read the information provided by 
each advisory program on a daily basis.  A directory of the advisory programs included in the 
study can be found at the Agricultural Market Advisory Services (AgMAS) Project website 
(http://web.aces.uiuc.edu/farm.doc/agmas/). 
 
Certain explicit assumptions are made to produce a consistent and comparable set of 
results across the different advisory programs.  These assumptions are intended to accurately 
depict “real-world” marketing conditions.  Several key assumptions are: i) with a few exceptions, 
the marketing window for the 1999 crop year is from September 1, 1998 through August 31, 
2000, ii) cash prices and yields refer to a central Illinois producer, iii) all storage is assumed to 
occur off-farm at commercial sites, and iv) marketing loan recommendations made by advisory 
programs are followed wherever feasible. 
 
The average net advisory price across all 26 corn programs in 1999 is $2.02 per bushel, 
three cents below the market benchmark price.  The range of net advisory prices for corn is 
substantial, with a minimum of $1.66 per bushel and a maximum of $2.49 per bushel.  The 
average net advisory price across all 25 soybean programs in 1999 is $5.67 per bushel, seventeen 
cents above the market benchmark.  As with corn, the range of net advisory prices for soybeans is 
substantial, with a minimum of $4.68 per bushel and a maximum of $7.10 per bushel.  The 
average revenue achieved by following both the corn and soybean programs offered by an 
advisory service is $299 per acre, $2.00 more than market benchmark revenue for 1999.  The 
spread in advisory revenue also is noteworthy, with the difference between the bottom- and top-
performing advisory programs reaching more than $100 per acre. 
 
  An advisory program’s net price or revenue received is an important indicator of 
performance.  However, it is the tradeoff between pricing performance and risk that is likely to 
be of greatest interest to producers.  Based on the data available for 1995-1999 crop years, a 
positive tradeoff between average net advisory price and risk is found for corn and revenue; 
producing higher net prices generally requires that an advisory program take on more risk, and 
vice versa.  However, only one advisory program in corn outperforms the 24-month market 
benchmark when both price and risk are considered.  Four do so in soybeans, and none based on 
revenue.  These performance results are sensitive to the specification of the market benchmark. 
In addition, it is important to emphasize that the pricing and risk performance results are based 
on five observations.  This is a relatively small sample for estimating the true risks of market 
advisory programs.  Hence, the return-risk results should be viewed as an exploratory approach 
rather than definitive.Introduction to the AgMAS Project 
 
 
  Grain producers operate in a highly uncertain economic environment. The roller coaster 
movement of corn and soybean prices since 1995 is ample evidence of the uncertainty and risk 
facing grain producers.  In this rapidly changing environment, marketing and risk management 
play an important role in the overall management of farm businesses.  The use of private-sector 
advisory services has increased over time as producer demand for marketing and risk 
management advice has increased.  Surveys document the high value that many producers place 
on market advisory services.
1 
 
  Despite their current popularity and expected importance in the future, surprisingly little is 
known about the marketing and risk management strategies recommended by these services and 
their associated performance.  There is a clear need to develop an ongoing “track record” of the 
performance of these services.  Information on the performance of advisory services will assist 
producers in identifying successful alternatives for marketing and price risk management. 
 
 The  Agricultural Market Advisory Services (AgMAS) Project, initiated in 1994, addresses 
the need for information on advisory services.  The project is jointly directed by Dr. Darrel L. 
Good and Dr. Scott H. Irwin of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.  Correspondence 
with the AgMAS Project should be directed to:  Dr. Joao Martines-Filho, AgMAS Project 
Manager, 434a Mumford Hall, 1301 West Gregory Drive, University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign, Urbana, IL 61801; voice:  (217)333-2792;  fax:  (217)333-5538; e-mail:  
agmas@uiuc.edu.  The AgMAS Project also has a website that can be found at the following 
address: http://web.aces.uiuc.edu/farm.doc/agmas/. 
 
  Funding for the AgMAS project is provided by the following organizations: Illinois 
Council on Food and Agricultural Research; Cooperative State Research, Education, and 
Extension Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture; Economic Research Service, U.S. 
Department of Agriculture; the Risk Management Agency, U.S. Department of Agriculture, and 
the Initiative for Future Agriculture and Food Systems, U.S. Department of Agriculture. 
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Purpose of Report 
 
 
  The primary purpose of this research report is to present an evaluation of advisory service 
pricing performance for the 1999 corn and soybean crops.  Specifically, the net price received by 
a subscriber to an advisory service is calculated for corn and soybean crops harvested in 1999.  
With a few exceptions, the marketing window for the 1999 crop year is from September 1, 1998 
through August 31, 2000.  Another purpose of this report is to compare the pricing performance 
results for the 1999 corn and soybean crops with previously released results for the 1995, 1996, 
1997 and 1998 crop years. 
 
  A relevant question is whether useful conclusions about pricing performance can be made 
based on data from five crop years.  From a purely statistical standpoint, samples with five 
observations typically are considered small.  This perspective would suggest it is inappropriate to 
draw too many conclusions from the available data on pricing performance.  From a practical, 
decision-making standpoint, samples with five observations often are considered adequate to 
reach conclusions.  A useful comparison in this context can be made to university yield trials for 
crop varieties. As an example, the University of Illinois Variety Testing program 
(http://www.cropsci.uiuc.edu/vt/) presents only two-year or three-year averages of the yields for 
crop varieties in the trials, and in many cases these cannot be computed because of turnover in 
the varieties tested from year-to-year. Despite the limitations, this type of yield trial data is 
widely used by farmers in making varietal selections.  On balance, then, it seems reasonable to 
argue that the five years of data currently available on pricing performance may be used to make 
some modest conclusions. Caution obviously is in order given the possibility of results being due 
to random chance in a relatively small sample. 
 
  This report has been reviewed by the AgMAS Review Panel, which provides independent, 
peer-review of AgMAS Project research.  The members of this panel are: Frank Beurskens, 
Director of Product Strategy for e-markets; Jeffrey A. Brunoehler, Market President of the 
AMCORE Bank in Mendota, Illinois; Renny Ehler, producer in Champaign County, Illinois; 
Chris Hurt, Professor in the Department of Agricultural Economics at Purdue University; Terry 
Kastens, Associate Professor in the Department of Agricultural Economics at Kansas State 
University and producer in Rawlins County, Kansas; and Robert Wisner, University Professor in 
the Department of Economics at Iowa State University. 
 
  The next section of the report describes the procedures used to collect the data on market 
advisory service recommendations.  The following section describes the methods and 
assumptions used to calculate the returns to marketing advice.  The third section of the report 
presents 1999 pricing results for corn and soybeans.  The fourth section presents a summary of 
the combined results for the 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 and 1999 crop years.  The final section 




  3 
Data Collection  
 
The market advisory services included in this evaluation do not comprise the population 
of market advisory services available to producers.  The included services also are not a random 
sample of the population of market advisory services.  Neither approach is feasible because no 
public agency or trade group assembles a list of advisory services that could be considered the 
"population."  Furthermore, there is not a generally agreed upon definition of an agricultural 
market advisory service.  To assemble the sample of services for the AgMAS Project, criteria 
were developed to define an agricultural market advisory service and a list of services was 
assembled. 
 
The first criterion used to identify services is that a service has to provide marketing 
advice to producers. Some of the services tracked by the AgMAS Project do provide speculative 
trading advice, but that advice must be clearly differentiated from marketing advice to producers 
for the service to be included.  The terms "speculative" trading of futures and options versus the 
use of futures and options for "hedging" purposes are used for identification purposes only.  A 
discussion of what types of futures and options trading activities constitute hedging, as opposed 
to speculating, is not considered in this study. 
 
The second criterion is that specific advice must be given for making cash sales of the 
commodity, in addition to any futures or options hedging activities.  In fact, some marketing 
programs evaluated by the AgMAS Project do not make any futures and options 
recommendations.  However, marketing programs that make futures and options hedging 
recommendations, but fail to clearly state when cash sales should be made, or the amount to be 
sold, are not considered. 
 
A third, and fairly obvious, criterion is that the advice must be transmitted to subscribers 
before the action is to be taken.  This is largely the reason why electronically-delivered services 
are evaluated.  Recommendations that take the form of, "today would have been a good day to 
sell," that are received by a subscriber after the market has closed are clearly of little value from a 
marketing standpoint. 
 
  The original sample of market advisory services that met the three criteria was drawn 
from the list of "Premium Services" available from the two major agricultural satellite networks, 
Data Transmission Network (DTN) and FarmDayta, in the summer of 1994.
2, 3 While the list of 
advisory services available from these networks was by no means exhaustive, it did have the 
considerable merit of meeting a market test.  Presumably, the services offered by the networks 
were those most in demand by farm subscribers to the networks.  In addition, the list of available 
                                                 
2  When the AgMAS study began in 1994, DTN and FarmDayta were separate companies.  The two companies 
merged in 1996. 
 
3 This requirement has been relaxed in recent years to reflect the growing importance of alternative means of 
electronic delivery of market advisory services.  Beginning in 1997, a service that meets the original two criteria and 
is available on a "real-time" basis electronically may be included in the sample.  Two examples are Utterback 
Marketing Service, which is carried on a world wide website, and Ag Review, which is available via e-mail.  Both 
are for-pay subscription services.  4 
services was cross-checked with other farm publications to confirm that widely-followed 
advisory firms were included in the sample.  It seems reasonable to argue that the resulting 
sample of services was (and remains) generally representative of the majority of advisory 
services available to producers. 
 
The total number of advisory programs evaluated for the 1999 crop year is 26 for corn 
and 25 for soybeans.  The term “advisory program” is used because several advisory services 
have more than one distinct marketing program.  Ag Line by Doane, Brock Associates, Pro 
Farmer, and Stewart-Peterson Advisory Services each have two distinct marketing programs, 
Risk Management Group has three distinct marketing programs and Agri-Visor has four distinct 
marketing programs.  Allendale provides two distinct programs for corn, but only one for 
soybeans. 
 
For a variety of reasons, deletions and additions to the sample of advisory programs has 
occurred over time.  Zwicker Cycle Letter is included in the study for the 1995 - 1998 crop years, 
however, it merged with Agri-Visor for the 1999 crop year.  Progressive Ag is included in the 
study for the 1996 - 1999 crop years, but was not included in 1995 because it had not yet come to 
the Project's attention.  Utterback Marketing Services is included in 1997 - 1999 crop years, but 
was not included in 1995 or 1996 because its marketing programs were not deemed to be clear 
enough to be followed by the AgMAS Project.  Ag Alert for Ontario was included in 1996, but 
its advice is geared to Canadian producers and was not deemed to be generalizable to U.S. 
producers, and subsequently was dropped.  Grain Field Report, Harris Weather/Elliott Advisory, 
North American Ag, and Prosperous Farmer were in the study during 1995 and/or 1996, but are 
not included in 1997 - 1999 because they no longer provide specific recommendations regarding 
cash sales.  Agri-Edge was included in previous reports, but the program was discontinued 
during the 1997 crop year.  Allendale futures & options and Ag Line by Doane hedge programs 
for corn are first tracked for the 1996 crop year.  The Ag Line by Doane hedge program for 
soybeans is first tracked for the 1998 crop year.  Cash Grain and Risk Management Group 
programs are first tracked for the 1999 crop year. 
 
  Two forms of sample selection biases may be potential problems when assembling an 
advisory program database.  The first form is survival bias, which occurs if only advisory 
programs that remain in business at the end of a given period are included in the sample.  
Survival bias significantly biases measures of performance upwards since "survivors" typically 
have higher performance than "non-survivors."
4  This form of bias should not be present in the 
AgMAS database of advisory programs because all programs ever tracked are included in the 
sample.  The second and more subtle form of bias is hindsight bias, which occurs if data from 
prior periods are "back-filled" at the point in time when an advisory program is added to the 
database.  Statistically, this has the same effect as survivorship bias because data from surviving 
advisory programs is back-filled.  This form of bias should not be present in the AgMAS 
database because recommendations are not back-filled when an advisory program is added.  
Instead, recommendations are collected only for the crop year after a decision has been made to 
add an advisory program to the database. 
                                                 
4 Brown, S.J., W. Goetzmann, R.G. Ibbotson, and S.A. Ross." Survivorship Bias in Performance Studies." Review of 
Financial Studies. 5(1992):553-580.  5 
 
The actual daily process of collecting recommendations for the sample of advisory 
programs begins with the purchase of subscriptions to each of the programs.  Staff members of 
the AgMAS Project read the information provided by each advisory program on a daily basis.  
The information is received electronically, via DTN, website or e-mail.  For the programs that 
provide two daily updates, typically in the morning and at noon, information is read in the 
morning and afternoon.  In this way, the actions of a producer-subscriber are simulated in “real-
time.” 
 
The recommendations of each advisory program are recorded separately.  Some advisory 
programs offer two or more distinct marketing programs.  This typically takes the form of one set 
of advice for marketers who are willing to use futures and options (although futures and options 
are not always used), and a separate set of advice for producers who only wish to make cash 
sales.




When a recommendation is made regarding the marketing of corn or soybeans, the 
recommendation is recorded.  In recording recommendations, specific attention is paid to which 
year’s crop is being sold, (e.g., 1999 crop year), the amount of the commodity to be sold, which 
futures or options contract is to be used (where applicable), and any price targets that are 
mentioned (e.g., sell cash corn when March 2000 futures reaches $2.40).  When price targets are 
given and not immediately filled, such as a stop order in the futures market, the recommendation 
is noted until the order is either filled or canceled. 
 
Several procedures are used to check the recorded recommendations for accuracy and 
completeness.  Whenever possible, recorded recommendations are cross-checked against later 
status reports provided by the relevant advisory program.  Also, at the completion of the crop 
year, it is confirmed whether cash sales total exactly 100 percent, all futures positions are offset, 
and all options positions are offset or expire worthless. 
 
The final set of recommendations attributed to each advisory program represents the best 
efforts of the AgMAS Project staff to accurately and fairly interpret the information made 
available by each advisory program.  In cases where a recommendation is considered vague or 
unclear, some judgment is exercised as to whether or not to include that particular 
recommendation.  This occurs most often when a program suggests “a producer might consider” 
a position, or when minimal guidance is given as to the quantity to be bought or sold.  Given that 
some recommendations are subject to interpretation, the possibility is acknowledged that the 
AgMAS track record of recommendations for a given program may differ from that stated by the 
advisory program, or from that recorded by another subscriber. 
                                                 
5 Some of the programs that are depicted as “cash-only” do in fact have some futures-related activity, due to the use 
of hedge-to-arrive contracts, basis contracts, and some use of options. 
 
6 There are some instances where a service clearly differentiates strategies based on the availability of on-farm versus 
off-farm (commercial) storage.  In these instances, recorded recommendations reflect the off-farm storage strategy.  
Otherwise, services do not differentiate strategies according to the availability of on-farm storage.  6 
 
Calculating the Returns to Marketing Advice 
 
At the end of the marketing period, all of the (filled) recommendations are aligned in 
chronological order.  The advice for a given crop year is considered to be complete for each 
advisory program when cumulative cash sales of the commodity reach 100 percent, all futures 
positions covering the crop are offset, all option positions covering the crop are either offset or 
expire, and the advisory program discontinues giving advice for that crop year.  The returns to 
each recommendation are then calculated in order to arrive at a weighted average net price that 
would be received by a producer who precisely follows the marketing advice (as recorded by the 
AgMAS Project). 
 
In order to produce a consistent and comparable set of results across the different 
advisory programs, certain explicit assumptions are made.  These assumptions are intended to 




  The simulation is designed to reflect conditions facing a representative central Illinois 
corn and soybean producer.  Whenever possible, data are collected for the Central Crop 
Reporting District in Illinois as defined by the National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) of 
the US Department of Agriculture (USDA).  The eleven counties (DeWitt, Logan, McLean, 
Marshall, Macon, Mason, Menard, Peoria, Stark, Tazewell, and Woodford) that make up this 
District are highlighted in Figure 1. 
 
It should be noted that the relative results of the analysis are likely to be similar if another 
geographic location is used.  The calculated returns to all the trading programs (as well as the 
benchmark prices) would most likely “shift” due to basis differentials.  However, the exact 




A two-year marketing window, spanning September 1, 1998 through August 31, 2000, is 
used in the analysis.  The beginning date is selected because services in the sample generally 
begin to make recommendations around this date.  The ending date is selected to be consistent 
with the ending date for corn and soybean marketing years as defined by the USDA.  There are a 
few exceptions to the marketing window definition.  One advisory program had a relatively small 
amount (10 percent) of cash corn and soybeans unsold as of August 31, 2000.  These bushels 
were sold in the spot cash market on September 1, 2000.  One program maintained relatively 
large (50 percent for corn and 66 percent for soybeans) long call “re-ownership” positions for 
corn and soybeans until October and November 2000, respectively, when they expired worthless. 
Finally, three advisory programs for corn and two for soybeans began pre-harvest hedges prior to 
September 1, 1998.  In all of the previous cases, the actual recommendations on the indicated 
dates are recorded and used in the analysis.  Finally, note that throughout the remainder of this 




The price assigned to each cash sale recommendation is the central Illinois closing, or 
overnight, bid.  The North and South Central Illinois Price Reporting Districts are highlighted in 
Figure 2.  The data are collected and reported by the Illinois Department of Ag Market News.
7  
The central Illinois price is the mid-point of the range of bids by elevators in the North Central 
and South Central Price Reporting Districts, as defined by the Illinois Department of Ag Market 
News.  Prices in this 35-county area best reflect prices for the assumed geographic location of the 
representative central Illinois producer (Central Illinois Crop Reporting District). 
 
Pre-harvest cash forward contract prices for fall delivery are also needed.  Pre-harvest 
bids collected by the Illinois Department of Ag Market News are used when available.  The 
central Illinois pre-harvest price is the mid-point of the daily range of pre-harvest bids by 
elevators in the North Central and South Central Price Reporting Districts, again, as defined by 
the Illinois Department of Ag Market News.  Pre-harvest forward prices from this source are 
available for corn and soybeans from December 18, 1998 to September 10, 1999. 
 
Since the marketing window for the 1999 corn and soybean crops begins in September 
1998, and the Illinois Department of Ag Market News did not begin to report actual cash forward 
bids until December 18, 1998, pre-harvest prices need to be estimated for the first few months of 
the marketing window.  For a date between September 1, 1998 and December 17, 1998, a two-
step estimation procedure is adopted.  First, the forward basis for the period in question is 
estimated by the average forward basis for the first five days actual forward contract bids are 
reported by the Illinois Department of Ag Market News (December 18-28, 1998)
 .
8  Second, the 
estimated forward basis is added to the settlement price of the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) 
1999 December corn futures contract or 1999 November soybean futures contract between 
September 1, 1998 and December 17, 1998. This estimation procedure is expected to be a 
reasonably accurate reflection of actual forward prices for the early period of the marketing 
window, as the actual price of the harvest futures contract is used and only the forward basis is 
estimated. 
 
Some market advisory programs recommended the use of post-harvest forward contracts 
to sell part of the 1999 corn and soybean crops.  The Illinois Department of Ag Market News did 
report post-harvest bids for January 2000 delivery from September 13, 1999 to December 10, 
1999.  They also report post-harvest bids for March 2000 delivery from December 13, 1999 to 
January 31, 2000.  These bids for central Illinois are used wherever applicable.  For the 1999 
crop year, forward bids were available to match all advisory service recommendations. 
 
                                                 
7 The daily prices can be found in The Wall Street Journal and at the following website: 
http://www.ams.usda.gov/mnreports/GX_GR113.txt. 
 
8 The average forward basis (cash forward prices for fall delivery – December 1999 corn or November 1999 
soybeans futures prices) over December 18-28, 1998 was -$0.241 per bushel for corn and -$0.253 per bushel for 
soybeans. The basis data are published at the following website: http://web.aces.uiuc.edu/farm.doc/basis/index.cfm.  8 
In the future, if the positions recommended by advisory programs either do not match the 
delivery periods or are made after the Illinois Department of Ag Market News stops reporting 
post-harvest forward contract prices, the following procedure will be used to estimate the post-
harvest forward contract prices needed in the analysis.  First, three elevators in central Illinois 
who agreed to supply data on spot and forward contract prices on the dates when advisors made 
such recommendations will be contacted.  Each of these elevators is in a different county in the 
Central Illinois Crop Reporting District (Logan, McClean, DeWitt).  Second, the spread between 
each elevator’s forward price and spot price will be calculated for the relevant date.  Third, the 
forward spread will be averaged across the three elevators for the same date.  Fourth, the average 
forward spread from the three elevators will be added to the central Illinois cash price (discussed 
at the beginning of the section) to arrive at an estimated post-harvest forward contract price for 
central Illinois.  This procedure was used in a few cases for the 1998 crop year. 
 
The fill prices for futures and options transactions generally are the prices reported by the 
programs.  In cases where a program did not report a specific fill price, the settlement price for 






Since most of the advisory program recommendations are given in terms of the 
proportion of total production (e.g., “sell 5 percent of 1999 crop today”), some assumption must 
be made about the amount of production to be marketed.  For the purposes of this study, if the 
per-acre yield is assumed to be 100 bushels, then a recommendation to sell 5 percent of the corn 
crop translates into selling 5 bushels.  When all of the advice for the marketing period has been 
carried out, the final per-bushel selling price is the average price for each transaction weighted by 
the amount marketed in each transaction. 
 
The above procedure implicitly assumes that the “lumpiness” of futures and/or options 
contracts is not an issue.  Lumpiness is caused by the fact that futures contracts are for specific 
amounts, such as 5,000 bushels per CBOT corn futures contract.  For large-scale producers, it is 
unlikely that this assumption adversely affects the accuracy of the results.  This may not be the 




Yields and Harvest Definition 
 
When making hedging or forward contracting decisions prior to harvest, the actual yield 
is unknown.  Hence, an assumption regarding the amount of expected production per acre is 
                                                 
9 Liquidity costs reflect the fact that non-floor traders must buy at the ask price and sell at the bid price.  The 
difference between the bid and ask prices, termed the bid-ask spread, is the return earned by floor traders for 
“making the market.” 
 
10 The practical importance of “lumpiness” problems even for small farms may be limited, due to the availability of 
“mini-contracts” at the Mid-America Exchange.  These futures and options contracts are specified in 1,000 bushel 
increments.  9 
necessary to accurately reflect the returns to marketing advice.  Prior to harvest, the best estimate 
of the current year’s expected yield is likely to be a function of yield in previous years.  In this 
study, the assumed yield prior to harvest is the calculated trend yield, while the actual reported 
yield is used from the harvest period forward.  The expected yield is based upon a linear 
regression trend model of actual yields from 1972 through 1998 for the Central Illinois Crop 




In central Illinois, the expected 1999 yield for corn is calculated to be 145.6 bushels per 
acre (bpa).  Therefore, recommendations regarding the marketing quantity made prior to harvest, 
are based on yields of 145.6 bpa.  For example, a recommendation to forward contract 20 percent 
of expected 1999 production translates into a recommendation to contract 29.12 bpa (20 percent 
of 145.6).  The actual reported corn yield in central Illinois in 1999 is 158 bpa.  The same 
approach is used for soybean evaluations.  The calculated 1999 trend yield for soybeans in central 
Illinois is 47.8 bpa, and the actual yield in 1999 is 49 bpa. 
 
It is assumed that after harvest begins, producers have reasonable ideas of what their 
actual realized yield will be.  Since harvest occurs at different dates each year, estimates of 
harvest progress as reported by NASS in central Illinois are used.  Harvest progress estimates 
typically are not made available soon enough to identify precisely the beginning of harvest, so an 
estimate is made based upon available data.  Specifically, the date on which 50 percent of the 
crop is harvested is defined as the "mid-point" of harvest.  The entire harvest period then is 
defined as a five-week window, beginning two and one-half weeks before the harvest mid-point, 
and ending two and one-half weeks after the harvest mid-point.  In most years, a five-week 
window will include at least 80 percent of the harvest. 
 
For 1999, the harvest period for corn is defined as September 16, 1999 through October 
20, 1999.  For soybeans, the harvest period is September 23, 1999 through October 27, 1999.  
Therefore, for corn, recommendations made after September 16 are applied on the basis of the 
actual yield of 158 bpa.  For soybeans, recommendations made after September 23 are applied on 
the basis of the actual yield of 49 bpa. 
 
The issue of changing yield expectations typically is not dealt with in the 
recommendations of the advisory programs.  For the purpose of this study, the actual harvest 
yield must exactly equal total cash sales of the crop at the end of the marketing time frame.  
Hence, an adjustment in yield assumptions from expected to actual levels must be applied to cash 
transactions at some point in time.  In this analysis, an adjustment is made in the amount of the 
first cash sale made after the beginning of the harvest period.  For example, if a program advises 
forward contracting 50 percent of the corn crop prior to harvest; this translates into sales of 72.8 
bpa (50 percent of 145.6).  However, when the actual yield is applied to the analysis, sales-to-
date of 72.8 bpa imply that only 46.1 percent of the actual crop has been contracted.  In order to 
compensate, the amount of the next cash sale is adjusted to align the amount sold.  In this 
                                                 
11 Fackler, P.L., D.L. Young, and G.A. Carlson.  "Estimates of Trend and Variability Patterns in U.S. Crop Yields," 
in Quantifying Long Run Agricultural Risks and Evaluating Farmers' Responses to Risk.  Proceedings of a seminar 
sponsored by the Southern Regional Project S-252, Jekyll Island, Georgia, March 1993.  10 
example, if the next cash sale recommendation is for a 10 percent increment of the 1999 crop, 
making the total recommended sales 60 percent of the crop, the recommendation is adjusted to 
13.92 percent of the actual yield (22 bushels), so that the total crop sold to date is 60 percent of 
158 bushels per acre (72.8 + 22 = 94.8 = 0.6*158).  After this initial adjustment, subsequent 
recommendations are taken as percentages of the 158 bpa actual yield, so that sales of 100 
percent of the crop equal sales of 158 bpa. 
 
While the amount of cash sales is adjusted to reflect the change in yield information, a 
similar adjustment is not made for futures or options positions that are already in place.  For 
example, assume that a short futures hedge is placed in the December 1999 corn futures contract 
for 25 percent of the 1999 crop prior to harvest.  Since the amount hedged is based on the trend 
yield assumption of 145.6 bpa, the futures position is 36.4 bpa (25 percent of 145.6).  After the 
yield assumption is changed, this amount represents a short hedge of 23.04 percent (36.4/158).  
The amount of the futures position is not adjusted to move the position to 25 percent of the new 
yield figure.  However, any futures (or options) positions recommended after the beginning of 
harvest are implemented as a percentage of the actual yield. 
 
  If actual yield is substantially below trend, and forward pricing obligations are based on 
trend yields, a producer may have difficulty meeting such obligations.  This raises the issue of 
updating yield expectations in “short” crop years to minimize the chance of defaulting on 
forward pricing obligations. While not yet encountered in the AgMAS evaluations of corn and 
soybeans, this situation has arisen in the evaluation of wheat.
12 
 
  As in wheat, a relatively simple procedure will be used to update yield expectations in 
any future corn or soybean short crop years.  First, trend yield will be used as the expected yield 
until the August USDA Crop Production Report is released, typically around August 10
th.  
Second, if the USDA corn or soybean yield estimate for the Central Illinois Crop Reporting 
District is 20 percent (or more) lower than trend yield, a “reasonable” producer is assumed to 
change yield expectations to the lower USDA estimate.  Third, as with normal crop years, the 
adjustment to actual yield is assumed to occur on the first day of harvest. 
 
The 20 percent threshold is intentionally relatively large for at least three reasons.  First, it 
is desirable to make adjustments to the trend yield expectation on a limited number of occasions.  
Given the large variability in annual yields, a small threshold could result in frequent 
adjustments.  Second, it is not uncommon for early yield estimates to deviate significantly from 
the final estimate.  A small threshold could result in unnecessary adjustments prior to harvest.  





                                                 
12 Jirik, M.A., S.H. Irwin, D.L. Good, T.E. Jackson, and J. Martines-Filho. “The 1995 Through 1998 Pricing 
Performance of Market Advisory Services for Wheat,” AgMAS Project Research Report 2000-02, June 2000.  This 
report is available on the AgMAS website (http://web.aces.uiuc.edu/farm.doc/agmas/reports/index.html).  11 
Brokerage costs are incurred when producers open or close positions in futures and 
options markets.  For the purposes of this study, it is assumed that brokerage costs are $50 per 
contract for round-turn futures transactions, and $30 per contract to enter or exit an options 
position.  Further, it is assumed that CBOT corn and soybean futures are used, and the contract 
size for each commodity is 5,000 bushels.  Therefore, per-bushel brokerage costs are $0.01 per 
bushel for a round-turn futures transaction and 0.6 cents per bushel for each options transaction. 
 
LDP and Marketing Assistance Loan Payments 
 
While the 1996 “Freedom-to-Farm” Act did away with government set-aside and target 
price programs, price protection for producers in program crops such as corn and soybeans was 
not eliminated entirely.  Minimum prices are established through a “loan” program.
 13  
Specifically, if market prices are below the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) loan rate for 
corn or soybeans, producers can receive payments from the US government that make up the 
difference between the loan rate and the lower market price.   There is considerable flexibility in 
the way the loan program can be implemented by producers.  This flexibility presents the 
opportunity for advisory programs to make specific recommendations for the implementation of 
the loan program.  Additionally, the prices of both corn and soybeans were below the loan rate 
during significant periods of time in the 1999-2000 marketing year, so that use of the loan 
program was an important part of marketing strategies.  As a result, net advisory program prices 
may be substantially impacted by the way the provisions of the loan program are implemented. 
 
Nearly all of the advisory programs tracked by the AgMAS project for the 1999 crop year 
make specific recommendations regarding the timing and method of implementing the loan 
program for the entire corn and soybean crops.
14  These recommendations are implemented as 
given wherever feasible.  Several decision rules have to be developed even in this case, in 
particular, for pre-harvest forward contracts.  For one corn program, loan recommendations are 
not made at all.  In this case, it is necessary to develop a more complete set of decision rules for 
implementing the loan program.  All loan-related decision rules are based on the assumption of a 
“prudent” or “rational” producer, within the context of the intent of the loan program.  More 
specifically, it is assumed that a producer will take advantage of the price protection offered by 
the loan program, even in the absence of specific advice from an advisory program. 
 
Before describing the decision rules, it is useful to provide a brief overview of the loan 
program mechanics.  Then, the rules developed to implement the loan program in the absence of 
specific recommendations can be described more effectively. 
 
                                                 
13 For a complete description of the programs discussed in this section, see the following Farm Service Agency fact 
sheets: Nonrecourse Marketing Assistance Loans and Loan Deficiency Payments, March 1998; Feed Grains, March 
1998; and Soybeans and Minor Oilseeds, July 1998. These can be found at 
http://www.fsa.usda.gov/pas/publications/facts/pubfacts.htm. 
 
14 Twenty-five of the 26 corn programs make a complete set of marketing loan recommendations (100 percent of 
actual production) for the 1999 crop year.  All soybean programs make a complete set of marketing loan 
recommendations.  12 
Program Mechanics 
 
   There are two mechanisms for implementing the price protection benefits of the loan 
program.  The first mechanism is the loan deficiency payment (LDP) program.  LDPs are 
computed as the difference between the loan rate for a given county and the posted county price 
(PCP) for a particular day.  PCPs are computed by the USDA and change each day in order to 
reflect the “average” market price that exists in the county.  For example, if the county loan rate 
for corn is $2.00 per bushel and the PCP for a given day is $1.50 per bushel, then the next day 
LDP is $0.50 per bushel.  If the PCP increases to $1.60 per bushel, the LDP will decrease to 




LDPs are made available to producers over the period beginning with corn or soybean 
harvest and ending May 31
st of the calendar year following harvest.  Producers have flexibility 
with regard to taking the LDP.  They may simply elect to take the payment when the crop is sold 
in a spot market transaction (before the end of May in the particular marketing year).  Or, 
producers can choose to take the LDP before the crop is delivered and sold.  Note that LDPs for 
the 1999 crop cannot be taken after a crop has been delivered and title has changed hands. 
 
The second mechanism is the nonrecourse marketing assistance loan program.  A loan 
cannot be taken on any portion of the crop for which an LDP has been received.  Under this 
program, producers may store the crop (on the farm or commercially), maintain beneficial 
interest, and receive a loan from the CCC using the stored crop as collateral.  The loan rate is the 
established rate in the county where the crop is stored and the interest rate is established at the 
time of loan entry.  Corn and soybean crops can be placed under loan anytime after the crop is 
stored through May 31
st of the following calendar year.  The loan matures on the last day of the 
ninth month following the month in which the loan was made. 
 
Producers may settle outstanding loans in two ways: i) repaying the loan during the 9-
month loan period, or ii) forfeiting the crop to the CCC at maturity of the loan.  Under the first 
alternative, the loan repayment rate is the lower of the county loan rate plus accrued interest or 
the marketing loan repayment rate, which is the PCP.  If the PCP is below the county loan rate, 
the economic incentive is to repay the loan at the posted county price.  The difference between 
the loan rate and the repayment rate is a marketing loan gain (MLG).  If the PCP is higher than 
the loan rate, but lower than the loan rate plus accrued interest, the incentive is also to repay the 
loan at the PCP.  Interest is charged on the difference between the PCP and the loan rate.  If the 
PCP is higher than the loan rate plus accrued interest, the incentive is to repay the loan at the loan 
rate plus interest. 
 
Under the second alternative, the producer stores the crop to loan maturity and then 
transfers title to the CCC. The producer retains the proceeds from the initial loan.  This was 
generally not an attractive alternative in the 1999 marketing year since the PCP was often below 
                                                 
15 Technically, PCPs for a given day are used by the USDA to compute LDPs for the following day. 
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the cash price of corn and soybeans.  Repaying the loan at the PCP and selling the crop at the 
higher cash price was economically superior to forfeiture. 
 
The nonrecourse loan program establishes the county loan rate as a minimum price for the 
producer, as does the LDP program.  For the 1999 crop, the sum of LDPs plus marketing loan 
gains was subject to a payment limitation of $150,000 per person.  Forfeiture on the loans 
provided the mechanism for receiving a minimum of the loan rate on bushels in excess of the 
payment limitation. 
 
The average loan rates for the 1999 corn and soybean crops across the eleven counties in 
the Central Illinois Crop Reporting District (DeWitt, Logan, McLean, Macon, Marshall, Mason, 
Menard, Peoria, Stark, Tazewell, and Woodford) are $1.95 and $5.42 per bushel, respectively.  
Market prices fell below these loan rates for extended periods of time during the 1999 marketing 
year.  This is reflected in Figure 3, which shows the corn and soybean LDP or MLG rates for 
central Illinois during the 1999 marketing year.
16, 17  For corn, LDPs or MLGs are relatively high 
during harvest, varying from $0.20 to $0.35 per bushel, and then fall to zero or near zero during 
winter and spring.  As cash corn prices fall during the summer of 2000, corn MLGs increase 
rapidly and reach the highest level for the 1999 crop year ($0.50 per bushel).  Soybean LDPs or 
MLGs are high during the 1999 harvest time, varying from $0.80 to $1.00 per bushel.  During the 
winter and spring, it decreases to almost zero, but is positive over the time.  As cash soybean 
prices fall during the summer of 2000, soybean MLGs increase rapidly from zero and peak at 
$1.20 per bushel in August 2000. 
 
Decision Rules for Programs with a Complete Set of Loan Recommendations 
 
If an advisory program makes a complete set of loan recommendations, the specific 
advice is implemented wherever feasible.  However, specific decision rules are still needed 
regarding pre-harvest forward contracts because it is possible for an advisory program to 
recommend taking the LDP on those sales before it is actually harvested and available for 
delivery in central Illinois.  To begin, it is assumed that amounts sold for harvest delivery with 
pre-harvest forward contracts are delivered first during harvest.  Since LDPs must be taken when 
title to the grain changes hands, LDPs are assigned as these “forward contract” quantities are 
harvested and delivered.  This necessitates assumptions regarding the timing and speed of 
harvest.  Earlier it was noted that a five-week harvest window is used to define harvest.  This 
window is centered on the day nearest to the mid-point of harvest progress as reported by NASS.  
Various assumptions could be implemented regarding harvest progress during this window.  
Lacking more precise data, a reasonable assumption is that harvest progress for an individual, 
representative farm is a linear function of time. 
                                                 
16 LDP and MLG data were obtained from the interactive LDP database at the Center for Agricultural and Rural 
Development (CARD) at the Iowa State University.  The LDP/MLG rates can be found at the following website: 
http://cardsrv6.card.iastate.edu/LDPHome.htm. 
 
17 The time period for each chart begins on the first day of harvest, as determined for this study, and ends on August 
31, 1999.  The first day of corn harvest is assumed to be September 16, 1999.  The first day of soybean harvest is 
assumed to be September 23, 1999.  14 
 
Tables 1 and 2 summarize the information used to assign LDPs to pre-harvest forward 
contracts.  The second column shows the amount harvested assuming a linear model. The third 
column shows the LDP available on each date of the harvest window and the fourth column 
presents the average LDP through each harvest date.  An example will help illustrate use of the 
tables.  Assume that an advisory program recommends, at some point before harvest, that a 
producer forward contract 50 percent of expected soybean production.  This translates into 23.9 
bpa when the percentage is applied to expected production (0.50 * 47.8 = 23.9).  Next, convert 
the bpa to a percentage of actual production, which is 48.8 percent (23.9/49 = 48.8).  To 
determine the LDP payment on the 48.8 percent of actual production forward contracted, simply 
read down Table 2 to 10/11/99, which is the date when 48.8 percent of harvest is assumed to be 
complete.  The average LDP up to that date (09/23/99 - 10/11/99) is $0.89 per bushel; the last 
column of Table 2.  This is the LDP amount assigned to the forward contract bushels. 
 
Note that LDPs for any sales (spot, forward contracts, futures or options) recommended 
during harvest are taken only after all forward contract obligations are fulfilled.  In addition, 
crops placed under loan by an advisory program do not accumulate interest opportunity costs 
because proceeds from the loan can be used to offset interest costs that otherwise would 
accumulate. 
 
Decision Rules for Programs with a Partial Set of Loan Recommendations 
 or No Loan Recommendations 
 
If an advisory program makes a partial set of loan recommendations, the available advice 
is implemented wherever feasible.  In the absence of specific recommendations, it is assumed 
that crops priced before May 31, 2000 are not placed under loan.  Those crops receive program 
benefits through LDPs. After May 31, 2000, eligible crops (unpriced crops for which program 
benefits have not yet been collected) are assumed to be under loan until priced. 
 
In the absence of specific recommendations, rules for assigning LDPs and MLGs are 
developed under the assumption that loan benefits are established when the crop is priced or as 
soon after pricing that is allowed under the rules of the program.  This principle is consistent with 
the intent of the loan program to fix a minimum price when pricing decisions are made.  Two 
rules are most important in the implementation of this principle.  First, LDP’s on pre-harvest 
sales (forward contracts, futures or options) are established as the crop is harvested.  Second, if 
the LDP or MLG is zero on the pricing date, or the first date of eligibility to receive a loan 
benefit, those values are assigned on the first date when a positive value is observed, assuming a 
beneficial interest in that portion of the crop has been maintained.  Specific rules for particular 
marketing tools and situations follow: 
 
1)  Pre-harvest forward contracts.  The same decision rules are applied as discussed in the 
previous section.  Specifically, it is assumed that amounts sold for harvest delivery with 
pre-harvest forward contracts are delivered first during harvest.  LDPs, if positive, are 
assigned as these “forward contract” quantities are harvested and delivered.  This 
necessitates assumptions regarding the timing and speed of harvest.  A linear model of  15 
harvest progress is assumed in the five-week harvest window.  The specific information 
used to assign LDPs to pre-harvest forward contracts is again found in Tables 1 and 2.  As a 
final point, note that LDPs for any other sales (spot, futures or options) recommended 
during harvest are taken only after all pre-harvest forward pricing obligations are fulfilled. 
 
2)  Pre-harvest short futures.  Pre-harvest pricing using futures contracts is treated in the same 
manner as pre-harvest forward contracts.  LDPs are assigned on open futures positions as 
the crop is harvested, or as soon as a positive LDP is available, if the futures position is still 
in place and cash sales have not yet been made.  These are assigned after forward contracts 
have been satisfied.  If the underlying crop is sold before there is a positive LDP, then that 
portion of the crop receives a zero LDP.  During the harvest window, if the futures position 
is offset before a positive LDP is available and the crop has not yet been sold in the cash 
market, that portion of the crop is eligible for loan benefits on the next pricing 
recommendation. 
 
3)  Pre-harvest put option purchases.  Long put option positions, which establish a minimum 
futures price, are treated in the same manner as pre-harvest short futures. 
 
4)  Post-harvest forward contracts.  The main issue with respect to post-harvest forward 
contracts is when to assign the LDPs or MLGs.  Those can be established on the date the 
contract is initiated, on the delivery date of the contract, or anytime in between.  Following 
the general principle outlined earlier, LDPs and MLGs for post-harvest contracts are 
assigned on the date the contract is initiated or the first day with positive benefits prior to 
delivery on the contract. 
 
5)  Post-harvest short futures.  As with post-harvest forward contracts, the main issue with 
post-harvest short futures positions is when to assign loan benefits.  These are assigned 
when the short futures position is initiated or as soon as a positive benefit is available if the 
futures position is still in place and cash sales have not been made.  If the underlying crop is 
sold before a positive LDP is available, that portion of the crop receives a zero LDP.  If the 
short futures position is offset before a positive LDP is available and the cash crop has not 
yet been sold, that portion of the crop is eligible for loan benefits on the next pricing 
recommendation. 
 
6)  Post-harvest long put positions.  Long put option positions established after the crop is 
harvested are treated in the same manner as post-harvest short futures 
 
7)  Spot sales before May 31, 2000.  If a spot cash sale of corn or soybeans is recommended 
before May 31, 2000, it is assumed that the LDP, if positive, is established that same day. 
 
8)  Loan program after May 31, 2000.  Since LDPs are not available after May 31, 2000, it is 
assumed that any corn or soybeans in storage and not priced as of this date, for which loan 
benefits have not been established, are entered in the loan program on that date.  This is a 
reasonable assumption since spot prices are below the loan rate for both soybeans and near 
the loan rate or corn in central Illinois on May 31, 2000 and a prudent producer would take  16 
advantage of the price protection offered by the loan program.  When the crops are 
subsequently priced (cash sale, forward contract, short futures, or long put option), the 
marketing loan gain, if positive, is assigned on that day.  Forfeiture is not an issue for these 
bushels because all cash sales were made before the end of the nine-month loan period.  
Note also that the $150,000 payment limitation is not considered in the analysis, as 




An important element in assessing returns to an advisory program is the economic cost 
associated with storing grain instead of selling grain immediately at harvest.  The cost of storing 
grain after harvest (carrying costs) consists of two components: physical storage charges and the 
opportunity cost incurred by foregoing sales when the crop is harvested.  Physical storage charges 
can apply to off-farm (commercial) storage, on-farm storage, or some combination of the two.  
Opportunity cost is the same regardless of the type of physical storage. 
 
For the purposes of this study, it is assumed that all storage occurs off-farm at 
commercial sites.
18  This is assumed for several reasons.  First, commercial storage costs reflect 
the full economic costs of physical storage, whereas on-farm storage cost estimates may not, due 
to differing accounting methods and/or time horizons.  Second, commercial storage costs are 
relatively consistent across producers in a given area, whereas on-farm storage costs likely vary 
substantially among producers.  Third, commercial storage cost data are readily available, 
whereas this is not the case for on-farm storage. 
 
Storage charges are assigned beginning October 21 for corn and October 28 for soybeans, 
the first dates after the end of the respective harvest windows.  Physical storage charges are 
assumed to be a flat $0.13 per bushel from the end of harvest through December 31.  After 
January 1, physical storage charges are assumed to be $0.02 per month (per bushel), with this 
charge pro-rated to the day when the cash sale is made.  The storage costs represent the typical 
storage charges for the 1999 crop quoted in a telephone survey of nine central Illinois elevators. 
 
The interest rate is assumed to be 9.2 percent per year, and is applied to the average 
harvest-time price for each crop.  This interest rate is the average rate for all commercial 
agricultural loans for the fourth quarter of 1999 as reported in the Agricultural Finance Databook 
published by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Board.
19  The interest charge for 
storing grain is the interest rate compounded daily from the end of harvest to the date of sale.
20 
                                                 
18 As mentioned earlier in this report, there are some instances where a service clearly differentiates strategies based 
on the availability of on-farm versus off-farm (commercial) storage.  In these instances, recorded recommendations 
reflect the off-farm storage strategy. 
19 This is a change from the previous years when the average interest rate for the fourth quarter of the current year 
and the first three quarters of the following year was used.  The change was made because the fourth quarter interest 
rate more accurately reflects actual opportunity costs. 
 
20 The daily interest rate, r, is computed as follows: 
0.0002412 1 (1.092) r
1/365 = − =  or 0.02412 percent per day 
  17 
 
In addition to the storage and interest costs, another charge is assigned to corn (but not 
soybeans) that goes into commercial storage.  This charge, referred to as a “shrink charge,” is 
commonly deducted by commercial elevators on “dry” corn that is delivered to the elevator to be 
stored, and reflects a charge for drying and volume reduction (shrinkage) that occurs in drying 
the corn from (typically) 15 percent to 14 percent moisture.  The charge for drying is a flat $0.02 
per bushel, while the charge for volume reduction is 1.3 percent per bushel.  Given that the 
harvest-time cash price in central Illinois for 1999 is $1.74 per bushel, the charge for volume 
reduction is 2.3 cents per bushel ($1.74 * 0.013).  Therefore, the flat shrink charge assigned to all 
stored corn is 4.3 cents per bushel.
21  
 
It should be noted that the cost of drying corn down to 15 percent moisture and the cost of 
drying soybeans to storable moisture are not included in the calculations.  This cost is incurred 
whether or not the grain is stored or sold at harvest, or whether the grain is stored on-farm or off-
farm. 
 
The calculation of carrying charges may be impacted by an advisory program’s loan 
recommendations and/or the decision rules discussed in the previous section.  Specifically, 
during the period corn or soybeans are placed under loan, interest costs are not accumulated, as 
the proceeds from the loan can be used to offset interest opportunity costs that otherwise would 
accumulate.  This most commonly occurs after May 31, 2000, when it is assumed that all 
unpriced grain is placed under loan until priced.  If a crop is priced (forward contracts, futures or 
options) while under loan but stored beyond the time of pricing, interest opportunity costs are 
accumulated from the day of pricing until the time storage ceases (since it is assumed the loan is 
repaid on the date of pricing). 
 
Finally, it could be argued that interest opportunity costs should be charged based on the 
LDP available at harvest but not taken by an advisory program.  This adjustment is not made 







In addition to comparing the net price received across advisory programs, it is useful to 
compare the results to simple market benchmark prices.  These prices are intended to provide 
information about the actual prices that are available for a particular crop, and provide an 
indication of how producers might fare using some basic marketing strategies that do not require 
professional marketing advice. 
 
Conceptually, a useful benchmark should: i) be simple to understand and to calculate; ii) 
represent the returns to a marketing strategy that could be implemented by producers; iii) be 
                                                 
21 Note that the shrink charge is not applied to corn that is sold via a pre-harvest forward contract or harvest spot 
sale.  18 
directly comparable to the net advisory price received from following the recommendations of a 
market advisory program; iv) not be a function of the actual recommendations of the advisory 
programs or of the actual marketing behavior of producers, but rather should be external to their 
marketing activities; and v) be stable, so that it represents the range of prices made available by 
the market throughout the marketing period instead of representing the price during a small 
segment of the marketing period. 
 
In the 1995 and 1996 AgMAS corn and soybean pricing performance reports, two market 
benchmark prices are reported: the average harvest-period price in central Illinois and the average 
price received by Illinois producers (as reported by USDA).  However, research conducted by the 
AgMAS Project indicates that these benchmarks have some weaknesses that make them less than 
ideal indicators of the price offered by the market for a given crop.
22  The harvest cash price only 
includes prices during a small portion of the entire period over which the crop could be marketed.  
In certain years, this price may not fairly represent the true range of prices available.  The 
calculation of the harvest cash price also can be sensitive to the specific time period selected as 
the harvest period.  The average price received by Illinois producers is not directly comparable to 
the net advisory price as calculated in this study because the average price received includes price 
discounts that are incurred because some grain marketed is of substandard quality, while the 
AgMAS Project assumes that all grain marketed meets the requirements of No. 2 yellow corn or 
No. 1 soybeans. 
 
  In the 1997 AgMAS corn and soybean pricing performance report, a new market 
benchmark price is introduced: the average cash price stated on a harvest equivalent basis for 
corn and soybeans over the entire marketing period.  For the 1999 crop, the benchmark is based 
on the average price over the 1999 crop year, which began on September 1, 1998 and ended on 
August 31, 2000.  Cash forward prices for central Illinois are used during the 1999 pre-harvest 
period, while daily spot prices for central Illinois are used for the 1999 post-harvest period.  The 
same forward and spot price series applied to advisory program recommendations are used to 
construct the benchmark.  Details on the forward and cash price series can be found in the earlier 
“Prices” section of this report. 
 
The average cash price benchmark meets all of the selection criteria listed above, except 
it cannot be easily implemented by producers since it involves marketing a small portion of each 
crop every day of the two-year marketing window.  It can be shown, though, that the price 
realized via a more manageable strategy of routinely selling twelve times during the marketing 
window very closely approximates the average cash price.  Therefore, it is determined that the 
average cash price meets all five selection criteria and is the most appropriate market benchmark 
to be used in evaluating the pricing performance of market advisory programs. 
 
Three adjustments are made to the daily cash prices to make the average cash price 
benchmark consistent with the calculated net advisory prices for each marketing program.  The 
                                                 
22  A full discussion of the selection of the appropriate market benchmark price can be found in Good, D.L., S.H. 
Irwin and T.E. Jackson., "Development of a Market Benchmark Price for AgMAS Performance Evaluations,” 
AgMAS Project Research Report 1998-02, December 1998, which can be obtained at the AgMAS website 
(http://web.aces.uiuc.edu/farm.doc/agmas/reports/index.html).  19 
first is to take a weighted average price, to account for changing yield expectations, instead of 
taking the simple average of the daily prices.  This adjustment is consistent with the procedure 
described previously in the "Yields and Harvest Definition" section.  The daily weighting factors 
for pre-harvest prices are based on the calculated trend yield, while the weighting of the post-
harvest prices is based on the actual reported yield for central Illinois.  The second adjustment is 
to compute post-harvest cash prices on a harvest equivalent basis, which is done by subtracting 
carrying charges (storage, interest and shrink) from post-harvest spot cash prices.  The daily 
carrying charges are calculated in the same manner as those for net advisory prices. 
 
A third adjustment to the average cash price benchmark is new with the 1998 and 1999 
reports.  In the context of evaluating advisory program recommendations, it was argued earlier 
that a “prudent” or “rational” producer would take advantage of the price protection offered by 
the loan program, even in the absence of specific advice from an advisory program.  This same 
logic suggests that a  “prudent” or “rational” producer will take advantage of the price protection 
offered by the loan program when following the benchmark average price strategy.  Based on this 
argument, the average cash price benchmark is adjusted by the addition of LDPs and MLGs.  
Bushels marketed in the pre-harvest period according to the benchmark strategy (approximately 
48 percent for corn and 52 percent for soybeans) are treated as forward contracts with the LDPs 
assigned at harvest.  Bushels marketed each day in the post-harvest period (approximately 52 
percent for corn and 48 percent for soybeans) are awarded the LDP or MLG in existence for that 
particular day.  Finally, just as in the case with comparable advisory program recommendations, 
interest opportunity costs are not charged to the benchmark after May 31, 2000 to reflect the 
assumption that stored grain is placed under loan. 
 
 
1999 Pricing Performance Results for the Advisory Programs 
 
Pricing performance results for the 1999 corn and soybean crops are presented in Tables 3 
through 5 and Figure 4.  For a specific example of how the marketing recommendations are 
translated into a final net advisory price that incorporates the simulation assumptions, please 
refer to the 1996 AgMAS Pricing Report.
23 
 
The program-by-program results of the evaluation of corn marketing programs are 
contained in Table 3.  This table shows the breakout of the components of the net advisory price 
as well as the net advisory price itself.  The 1999 average net advisory price for all 26 corn 
programs is $2.02 per bushel.  It is computed as the unadjusted cash sales price ($1.92 per 
bushel) minus carrying charges ($0.16 per bushel) plus futures and options gain ($0.05 per 
bushel) minus brokerage costs ($0.02 per bushel) plus LDP/MLG gain ($0.23 per bushel).  The 
average net advisory price for corn is three cents below the market benchmark price.  The range 
of net advisory prices for corn is fairly large, with a minimum of $1.66 per bushel and a 
maximum of $2.49 per bushel. 
                                                 
23Jackson, T.E., S.H. Irwin and D.L. Good. "1996 Pricing Performance of Market Advisory Services for Corn and 
Soybeans," AgMAS Project Research Report 1998-01, January 1998, pp. 10-13.  This report is available on the 
AgMAS website (http://web.aces.uiuc.edu/farm.doc/agmas/reports/index.html). 
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Table 4 lists the program-by-program results of the soybean evaluations.  The 1999 
average net advisory price for all 25 soybean programs is $5.67 per bushel.  It is computed as the 
unadjusted cash sales price ($4.74 per bushel) minus carrying charges ($0.17 per bushel) plus 
futures and options gain ($0.22 per bushel) minus brokerage costs ($0.02 per bushel) plus 
LDP/MLG gain ($0.92 per bushel).
24 The average net advisory price for soybeans is seventeen 
cents per bushel above the market benchmark price.  The range of net advisory prices for 
soybeans is exceptionally large, with a minimum of $4.68 per bushel and a maximum of $7.10 
per bushel. 
 
A point to consider when examining Tables 3 and 4 is the impact of the assumption that 
all storage occurs off-farm. It is possible to argue that short-run marginal costs of on-farm grain 
storage are zero if the facilities already exist and variable costs associated with handling grain 
and maintaining grain quality are not included.  Excluding the costs of commercial storage 
entirely (but continuing to subtract interest costs), the average net advisory price for corn 
increases to $2.15 per bushel and the net advisory price for soybeans increases to $5.77 per 
bushel.
25  The calculation of the market benchmark price also is impacted by such a change in the 
storage cost assumption, with the market benchmark price rising to $2.16 per bushel for corn and 
$5.58 per bushel for soybeans.  Therefore, if physical storage charges are assumed to be zero, the 
average net advisory price for corn is one cent below the market benchmark price, and the 
average net advisory price for soybeans is nineteen cents above the market benchmark price.  
Hence, there is only a minimal impact of changing storage assumptions on the pricing results. 
 
Since many Corn Belt producers grow both corn and soybeans, it also is useful to 
examine a combination of the results for the corn and soybean marketing programs.  In order to 
do this, gross revenue is calculated for a central Illinois producer who follows both the corn and 
soybean marketing advice of a given program.  It is assumed that the representative producer 
splits acreage equally (50/50) between corn and soybeans and achieves corn and soybean yields 
equal to the actual yield for the area in 1999.  The 50/50 advisory revenues are computed on a per 
acre basis and compared with the revenue a central Illinois producer could have received based 
on the market benchmark price for both corn and soybeans.  Advisory revenue per acre is 
calculated only for those programs that offer both corn and soybean marketing advice. 
 
Table 5 lists the program-by-program results of the 50/50 revenue analysis. The average 
revenue achieved by following both the corn and soybean programs offered by an advisory 
program is $299 per acre, $2 per acre above the market benchmark revenue for 1999 crop year. 
The spread in advisory revenue also is especially noteworthy, with the difference between the 
bottom- and top-performing advisory programs reaching more than $100 per acre. 
 
                                                 
24 The components do not sum exactly to the average net advisory price due to rounding. 
 
25 These alternative net prices are computed as,  
$2.15 per bushel = $2.02 (average net advisory price) + $0.10 (average advisory storage cost) + $0.03 (average 
advisory shrink cost) 
$5.77 per bushel = $5.67 (average net advisory price) + $0.10 (average advisory storage cost)  21 
For comparison purposes, the annual subscription cost of each advisory program also is 
listed in the last column of Table 5.  Subscription costs average $322 per program, about equal to 
the average advisory revenue for one acre of production, split 50/50 between corn and soybeans. 
Subscription costs do not appear to be large relative to total farm revenue, whether a large or 
small farm is considered. For a 1,000 acre farm, subscription costs average about one-tenth of 
one percent of total advisory revenue.  For a 250 acre farm, subscription costs average about 
four-tenths of one percent of total advisory revenue. Note that subscription costs are not 
subtracted from any of the revenue figures presented in Table 5. 
 
Another view of the pricing performance of the advisory programs is shown in Figure 4.  
Here, net advisory prices or revenues are ranked from highest to lowest and plotted versus the 
market benchmark.  As shown in the top chart, 14 of the 26 corn marketing programs achieve a 
net price that is equal to or higher than the market benchmark price.  As reported in the middle 
chart, 15 of the 25 soybean programs achieve a net advisory price equal to or higher than the 
market benchmark price. The bottom chart shows the comparison between 50/50 advisory 
revenue and the revenue implied by market benchmark prices.  Advisory revenue is greater than 
the market benchmark revenue for 13 out of 25 programs.  Note that the same advisory programs 
do not necessarily exceed the market benchmarks in each of the comparisons in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 5 shows the pattern of corn prices for the 1999 crop year.  The top chart shows 
daily cash prices from September 1, 1998 through August 31, 2000. The pre-harvest prices are 
the cash forward contract prices for harvest delivery. The middle chart is a repeat of the top chart 
with daily LDP or MLG added to the daily price. For the pre-harvest period, the LDP is the 
average LDP available at harvest time. The third chart offers a different perspective, in that 
during the post-harvest period the daily cash price is adjusted for cumulative carrying costs 
(shrink, interest, and storage charges).  The chart illustrates the pattern of harvest equivalent 
prices plus LDP or MLG. 
 
Corn prices for the 1999 crop year are highest in the pre-harvest period, with the cash 
forward contract price remaining above $2.00 per bushel until the beginning of July 1999.  Prices 
declined into harvest and made a post-harvest recovery during the spring of 1999.  New lows 
were made in the summer of 2000 on the basis of the prospects for another large harvest. The 
price pattern was typical for a large crop year followed by another large crop. 
 
LDPs were positive at harvest time, but cash prices moved above the Commodity Credit 
Corporation (CCC) loan rate in the early spring months. Marketing loan gains were large in 
August. When adjusted for carrying costs, prices declined slightly during the winter and spring 
and moved to extremely low levels in August 2000. The price pattern for the 1999 crop year 
favored those who made early pre-harvest sales and penalized those who stored a large portion of 
the crop unpriced late into the crop year. 
 
Figure 6 shows the pattern of soybean prices for the 1999 crop year. The three charts are 
the same as for corn, depicting daily cash prices, cash prices plus LDP/MLG, and cash prices 
plus LDP/MLG minus carrying charges. 
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Soybean prices for the 1999 crop followed a pattern similar to that for corn, except that 
the pre-harvest price decline started earlier. Pre-harvest forward contract prices were generally 
above $5.50 per bushel only until January 1999. Prices made a pre-harvest low, managed a 
modest post-harvest recovery, and then declined sharply into the last part of the marketing 
window. The post-harvest rally was associated with a brief period of concern about the South 
American crop and a typical post-harvest strengthening of the basis. The South American crop 
turned out to be large and US producers planted record soybean acreage in the spring of 2000. 
The 2000 harvest was the fourth consecutive large harvest in the US. Like corn prices, the pattern 
of soybean prices was classic for a large crop year followed by another large crop. LDPs were 
large at harvest time. Cash prices moved near the loan rate for a brief period in early May and 
then LDP/MLGs became large in the summer of 2000. 
 
The 1999/2000 price pattern for soybeans favored those who made sales very early and 
penalized those who stored the crop unpriced late into the marketing year. The penalty was 
especially large for those who established the LDP at harvest and stored the crop unpriced into 
the summer of 2000. 
 
Average Pricing Performance Results for the Advisory Programs 
 
A summary of the results of the pricing performance evaluations for the 1995 through 
1999 corn and soybean crop years is contained in Tables 6 through 11 and Figures 7 through 10.  
The results for the 1995 through 1998 crop years are those contained in the 1998 AgMAS Corn 
and Soybean Pricing Report.
26  Tables 6, 8 and 10 present pricing results for each year, while 
Tables 7, 9 and 11 show two-year averages (1998-1999), three-year averages (1997-1999), four-
year averages (1996-1999), and five-year averages (1995-1999).
27  Some marketing programs are 
not included in all of the averages.  For example, the five-year average is calculated only for the 
18 marketing programs that were evaluated for all five years. The following discussion focuses 
on the five-year average results. 
 
As shown in Table 7, the average net advisory corn price over the five years for the 18 
programs is $2.42 per bushel, one cent below the five-year market benchmark price of $2.43 per 
bushel.  The results range from a low of $2.27 to a high of $2.76 per bushel. 
 
The five-year results for soybeans are listed in Table 9.  The average net advisory soybean 
price over the five years is $6.32 per bushel, $0.12 above the five-year market benchmark price 
of $6.20 per bushel.  The results range from a low of $5.99 to a high of $6.79 per bushel. 
 
                                                 
26 Good, D.L., S.H. Irwin, T.E. Jackson, M.A. Jirik and J. Martines-Filho. “1998 Pricing Performance of Market 
Advisory Services for Corn and Soybeans,” AgMAS Project Research Report 2000-01, February 2000.  This report 
is available on the AgMAS website (http://web.aces.uiuc.edu/farm.doc/agmas/reports/index.html) 
 
27  In this section and the next, terms like “two-year average” are used to refer to averages of net advisory prices over 
multiple crop years.  23 
The five-year results for advisory revenue are presented in Table 11.  The average 
advisory revenue for the five years is $319 per acre.  This is $1 per acre higher than the five-year 
market benchmark revenue.  The results range from a low of $305 to a high of $353 per acre. 
 
As shown in the top chart in Figure 10, 5 of the 18 corn marketing programs achieve a 
five-year average net advisory price that is above the five-year average market benchmark price 
of $2.43 per bushel.  The middle chart in Figure 10 shows that 14 of the 18 soybean programs 
achieve a five-year average price that is equal or above the five-year average market benchmark 
price of $6.20 per bushel.  The bottom chart in Figure 10 shows the comparison of the five-year 
average advisory revenue versus the five-year average revenue implied by the market benchmark 
price.  Eight of the 18 advisory programs achieve a four-year average revenue that is equal or 
above average market benchmark revenue of $318 per acre. 
 
Pricing Performance and Risk of the Advisory Programs 
 
An advisory program’s net price received is an important indicator of performance.  
However, pricing performance almost certainly is not the only relevant indicator. For example, 
two advisory programs may generate the same average net price across marketing periods, but the 
risk of the programs may differ substantially.  The difference in risk may be the result of: i) type 
of recommended pricing tool (cash, forward, futures, options, etc.), ii) timing of sales, and iii) 
implementation of marketing strategies. 
 
In order to quantify the risk of advisory programs, a definition of risk must be developed.  
Risk is usually thought of as the possibility or probability of loss.  A natural extension of this 
idea looks at risk as the chance producers will fail to achieve the net price they expect based on 
following an advisory program.  This approach to quantifying risk does not measure the 
possibility of loss alone.  Risk is seen as uncertainty – the likelihood that what is expected will 
fail to happen, whether the outcome is better or worse than expected.  So an unexpected return on 
the upside or the downside – a net price of $2.50 or $1.50 per bushel when a net price of  $2.00 
per bushel is expected – counts in determining the “risk” of an advisory program.  Thus, an 
advisory program whose net price does not depart much from its expected, or average, net price 
is said to carry little risk.  In contrast, an advisory program whose net price is quite volatile from 
year-to-year, often departing from expected net price, is said to be quite risky. 
 
This approach to defining risk can be quantified by using a statistical measure called the 
standard deviation.
28  It measures the dispersion of year-to-year net advisory prices from the 
average net price.  One can think of the standard deviation as the “typical” variation in net price 
from year-to-year.  The larger the standard deviation of an advisory program, the less likely a 
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where T is the number of years in the sample, yt is the advisory program’s net price for the t
th year and  y  is the 
average net advisory price over the T years. 
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producer is to get exactly the net price expected, though it is possible by chance to get a higher 
price instead of a lower one for any particular time period. 
 
Separate analysis of market advisory pricing performance and risk will provide valuable 
information to producers.  However, as economic theories of decision-making under risk 
highlight, it is the tradeoff between pricing performance and risk that is likely to be of greatest 
interest to producers.
29  Theory suggests that above-average pricing performance should be 
possible only if marketing strategies are recommended that have above-average risk (and vice 
versa).  Faced with such a choice set, producers will choose an advisory program that has a 
pricing-risk tradeoff that is consistent with their risk preferences.
30 
 
The basic data needed for assessing the pricing-risk tradeoff of market advisory programs 
is presented in Table 12.  For each advisory program tracked in all five years of AgMAS 
evaluations, the five-year average net advisory price or revenue and standard deviation of net 
advisory price or revenue is reported.  The standard deviations indicate that the risk of advisory 
programs varies substantially.  In corn, the standard deviations range from a low of $0.19 per 
bushel to a high of $0.75 per bushel.  The average standard deviation across the 18 corn 
programs is $0.43 per bushel, which is higher than the $0.34 per bushel standard deviation of the 
corn market benchmark.  In soybeans, the standard deviations range from a low of $0.29 per 
bushel to a high of $1.10 per bushel.  The average standard deviation across the 18 soybean 
programs is $0.70 per bushel, which also is higher than the $0.59 per bushel standard deviation 
of the soybean market benchmark.  Finally, revenue standard deviations for the 18 programs 
range from a low of $19 per acre to a high of $46 per acre.  The average revenue standard 
deviation across the 18 programs is $34 per bushel, higher than the $28 per acre standard 
deviation of the market benchmark. 
 
The estimated relationship between pricing performance and risk for corn is presented in 
Figure 11.  As economic theory predicts, there is a positive tradeoff between the average price 
and standard deviation; securing a higher net corn price generally requires that an advisory 
program take on more risk, and vice versa.  The strength of the relationship is measured by the 
correlation coefficient, which can take on values between –1 and +1.  A negative value means 
that net price and standard deviation tend to move in opposite directions, while a positive value 
means they tend to move in the same direction.  The closer a correlation coefficient is to –1 or 
+1, the stronger the tendency.  Since the estimated correlation coefficient for corn is +0.55, a 
modestly strong relationship is indicated. 
 
The performance implications of the tradeoff between corn pricing performance and risk 
are explored in Figure 12. The chart is the same as in Figure 11, except it is now divided into 
four quadrants based on the average price and standard deviation of the market benchmark.  
Advisory programs in the upper left quadrant have a higher price and less risk than the 
benchmark, which is the most desirable outcome from a producer’s perspective.  Advisory 
                                                 
29 Ingersoll, J. Theory of Financial Decision Making.  Roman and Littlefield:  Savage, Maryland, 1987. 
 
30 A good non-technical introduction to measuring risk and performance in a return-risk framework can be found in:  
B.G. Malkiel.  A Random Walk Down Wall Street.  W.W. Norton & Company:  New York, New York, 1999.  25 
programs in the lower right quadrant have a lower price and more risk than the benchmark, 
which is the least desirable outcome from a producer’s perspective.  The two remaining 
quadrants reflect a higher price and more risk than the market benchmark or a lower price and 
less risk than the market benchmark.  A producer may prefer an advisory program to the market 
benchmark in either of these two quadrants, but this depends on personal preference for risk 
relative to return. 
 
The data plotted in Figure 12 show there is only one advisory program in corn that 
generates a combination of net price and risk superior to the market benchmark (upper left 
quadrant).  In contrast, nine advisory programs in corn produce a combination that is inferior to 
the benchmark (lower right quadrant).  Only four programs have a lower price and less risk than 
the benchmark, while nine programs have a higher price and more risk. 
 
The estimated relationship between pricing performance and risk for soybeans is 
presented in Figure 13.  Contrary to the prediction of economic theory, there is a negative 
tradeoff between the average price and standard deviation; achieving a higher net advisory price 
appears to require that an advisory program take on less risk, and vice versa.  The estimated 
correlation coefficient for soybeans is –0.36, so the relationship is only weakly negative. 
 
The data plotted in Figure 14 show there are four advisory programs in soybeans that 
generate a combination of net price and risk superior to the market benchmark (upper left 
quadrant).  Four advisory programs in soybeans produce a combination that is inferior to the 
benchmark (lower right quadrant).  No program has a lower price and less risk than the 
benchmark, while ten programs have a higher price and more risk. 
 
The estimated relationship between performance and risk for corn and soybean 50/50 
revenue is presented in Figure 15.  There is a positive tradeoff between average revenue and 
standard deviation; producing higher revenue generally requires that an advisory program take on 
more risk, and vice versa.  The estimated correlation coefficient for revenue is +0.47, indicating a 
modestly strong relationship between average revenue and risk. 
 
Based on 50/50 revenue, the data plotted in Figure 16 show that no advisory program 
generates a combination of average revenue and risk superior to the market benchmark (upper 
left quadrant).  Seven advisory programs produce a revenue combination that is inferior to the 
benchmark (lower right quadrant).  Only three programs have lower revenue and less risk than 
the benchmark, while eight programs have higher revenue and more risk. 
 
Previous research on financial investments suggests that return-risk results, like those 
presented above, may be sensitive to alternative specifications of the market benchmark.  To 
investigate this issue, the pricing (or revenue) performance and risk of market advisory programs 
is compared to a 20-month average cash price benchmark in Figures 17 through 19. Compared to 
the 24-month benchmark, the 20-month benchmark simply deletes the first four months of each 
marketing window from the computations of the benchmark price. The change has only a limited 
impact on the average benchmark price or revenue for the five years of analysis.  For corn, the 
average 20-month benchmark price is $2.42 per bushel, compared to $2.43 per bushel for the 24- 26 
month benchmark.  For soybeans, the average 20-month benchmark price is $6.15 per bushel, 
compared to $6.20 per bushel for the 24-month benchmark.  For 50/50 revenue, the average 20-
month benchmark revenue is $314 per acre, compared to $318 per acre for the 24-month 
benchmark.  The small differences are not surprising given the nature of the average cash price 
benchmarks.  In informationally efficient markets, annual averages of different average cash 
price benchmarks should be roughly similar when stated on a harvest equivalent basis.  
 
The previous logic does not necessarily carry over to the standard deviations of the 
alternative benchmarks.  Standard deviations for the 20-month benchmark should be higher than 
those of the 24-month benchmark because the 20-month benchmark includes less pre-harvest 
forward contracting than the 24-month benchmark.  All else equal, less pre-harvest forward 
contracting should lead to increased risk.  The standard deviation estimates are consistent with 
this logic.  For corn, the standard deviation for 20-month benchmark price is $0.44 per bushel, 
compared to $0.34 per bushel for the 24-month benchmark.  For soybeans, the standard deviation 
for 20-month benchmark price is $0.74 per bushel, compared to $0.59 per bushel for the 24-
month benchmark.  For 50/50 revenue, the standard deviation for 20-month benchmark revenue 
is $33 per acre, compared to $28 per acre for the 24-month benchmark.  It is interesting to note 
that the risk of the 20-month benchmark approximately matches the average risk of net advisory 
prices in corn, soybeans and 50/50 revenue. 
 
The comparisons in Figures 17 through 19 indicate that the risk-return performance of 
market advisory programs is sensitive to the change in market benchmarks.  This is most notable 
for the upper left performance quadrant, where advisory programs have higher prices and less 
risk than the market benchmark.  Three advisory programs generate average corn prices and risk 
in the upper left quadrant based on the 20-month benchmark, compared to only one with the 24-
month benchmark.  Twelve advisory programs generate average soybeans prices and risk in the 
upper left quadrant based on the 20-month benchmark, compared to only four with the 24-month 
benchmark. Six advisory programs generate average 50/50 revenue and risk in the upper left 
quadrant based on the 20-month benchmark, compared to none with the 24-month benchmark. 
 
While return-risk results are sensitive to alternative benchmarks, it is important to 
emphasize, whether a 24-month or 20-month benchmark is considered, that about half of the 
advisory programs generate average prices and risk in the higher price/more risk or lower 
price/less risk quadrants.  Hence, producing a higher average price or revenue typically requires 
that an advisory program take on more risk, and vice versa. 
 
Overall, the results presented in this section suggest performance analysis may be 
markedly affected by the inclusion of risk.  As an example, consider the case of soybeans using a 
24-month benchmark.
31  If only one dimension of performance is considered, the average net 
advisory price over the five-year period, 14 of the 18 soybean programs “beat” the 24-month 
market benchmark.  However, when two dimensions of performance are considered, average 
price and standard deviation, only four programs “beat” the 24-month market benchmark in 
                                                 
31 In all cases, the number of programs “beating the market” drops when considering one dimension versus two 
dimensions of pricing performance.  The drop is substantial in all cases except soybeans with the 20-month 
benchmark.  27 
soybeans.  The other 10 programs did not beat the market in a return-risk framework because 
they took on more risk to generate higher average prices. 
 
It is important to emphasize at this point that the pricing and risk performance results are 
based on only five observations.  This is a relatively small sample for estimating the true risks of 
market advisory programs.  Hence, the results presented in this section should be viewed as 
exploratory rather than definitive. 
 
Finally, the approach to performance evaluation presented in this section opens the door 
to a new type of analysis.  Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT) shows how to combine market 
advisory programs into “portfolios” that have the highest return for a given level of risk.  A 
“portfolio” might consist of 50 percent of corn and soybeans marketed by advisory program X 
and 50 percent marketed by advisory program Y.  MPT produces “efficient portfolios” by taking 
advantage of the diversification opportunities available through combining advisory programs. In 
fact, it is possible that some portfolios of advisory programs will generate higher prices and less 
risk than the market benchmark (lie in the upper left quadrant of Figures 12, 14 or 16), even 
though the individual advisory programs that make up the portfolio do not.  The potential 
improvement in performance depends on the degree to which net advisory prices do not tend to 
move together.  The application of MPT to market advisory services represents an interesting 
area of future research for the AgMAS Project. Harvest Average
Progress LDP LDP
Through on  Through
Date Date Date Date
---percent--- ---$/bushel--- ---$/bushel---
09/16/1999 4 0.26 0.26
09/17/1999 8 0.26 0.26
09/20/1999 12 0.26 0.26
09/21/1999 16 0.26 0.26
09/22/1999 20 0.24 0.26
09/23/1999 24 0.25 0.26
09/24/1999 28 0.27 0.26
09/27/1999 32 0.26 0.26
09/28/1999 36 0.21 0.25
09/29/1999 40 0.19 0.25
09/30/1999 44 0.19 0.24
10/01/1999 48 0.25 0.24
10/04/1999 52 0.29 0.25
10/05/1999 56 0.28 0.25
10/06/1999 60 0.29 0.25
10/07/1999 64 0.28 0.25
10/08/1999 68 0.31 0.26
10/11/1999 72 0.31 0.26
10/12/1999 76 0.36 0.26
10/13/1999 80 0.34 0.27
10/14/1999 84 0.33 0.27
10/15/1999 88 0.31 0.27
10/18/1999 92 0.31 0.27
10/19/1999 96 0.27 0.27
10/20/1999 100 0.28 0.27
Table 1. Linear Model of 1999 Corn Harvest Progress in 
Central Illinois and Associated Loan Deficiency Payment 
28Harvest Average
Progress LDP LDP
Through on  Through
Date Date Date Date
---percent--- ---$/bushel--- ---$/bushel---
09/23/1999 4 0.85 0.85
09/24/1999 8 0.95 0.90
09/27/1999 12 0.93 0.91
09/28/1999 16 0.88 0.90
09/29/1999 20 0.86 0.89
09/30/1999 24 0.84 0.89
10/01/1999 28 0.85 0.88
10/04/1999 32 0.95 0.89
10/05/1999 36 0.93 0.89
10/06/1999 40 0.92 0.90
10/07/1999 44 0.87 0.89
10/08/1999 48 0.89 0.89
10/11/1999 52 0.89 0.89
10/12/1999 56 0.86 0.89
10/13/1999 60 0.80 0.88
10/14/1999 64 0.80 0.88
10/15/1999 68 0.83 0.88
10/18/1999 72 0.88 0.88
10/19/1999 76 0.85 0.88
10/20/1999 80 0.82 0.87
10/21/1999 84 0.89 0.87
10/22/1999 88 0.97 0.88
10/25/1999 92 1.04 0.88
10/26/1999 96 0.98 0.89
10/27/1999 100 1.07 0.90
Table 2. Linear Model of 1999 Soybean Harvest Progress in 
Central Illinois and Associated Loan Deficiency Payment 
29(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Unadjusted Carrying Charges Futures & Net
Cash Sales Interest  Storage Shrink  Net Cash Options Brokerage LDP / Advisory
Market Advisory Program Price Costs Costs Costs Sales Price Gain Costs MLG Price
---$/bushel---
Ag Line by Doane (cash-only) 1.98 0.03 0.10 0.02 1.83 0.00 0.00 0.24 2.08
Ag Line by Doane (hedge) 1.98 0.03 0.10 0.02 1.83 0.06 0.00 0.24 2.13
Ag Profit by Hjort Associates 2.02 0.02 0.19 0.04 1.76 0.00 0.00 0.13 1.89
Ag Resource 1.96 0.04 0.14 0.04 1.74 0.52 0.01 0.24 2.49
Ag Review 2.07 0.01 0.09 0.02 1.94 0.06 0.01 0.14 2.12
Agri-Mark 1.72 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.72 0.04 0.01 0.28 2.03
Agri-Visor Aggressive Cash 1.84 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.84 0.00 0.00 0.28 2.12
Agri-Visor Aggressive Hedge 1.74 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.74 -0.03 0.00 0.28 1.99
Agri-Visor Basic Cash 1.82 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.82 0.00 0.00 0.28 2.10
Agri-Visor Basic Hedge 1.82 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.82 -0.03 0.00 0.28 2.07
Allendale (futures & options) 1.84 0.02 0.13 0.04 1.64 0.28 0.02 0.21 2.10
Allendale (futures only) 1.84 0.02 0.13 0.04 1.64 0.37 0.02 0.21 2.20
Brock (cash-only) 2.07 0.06 0.16 0.03 1.81 0.00 0.00 0.28 2.09
Brock (hedge) 1.83 0.03 0.13 0.04 1.62 0.18 0.06 0.29 2.03
Cash Grain 2.13 0.06 0.17 0.04 1.86 0.03 0.00 0.17 2.06
Freese-Notis 1.96 0.05 0.16 0.04 1.70 0.01 0.01 0.09 1.78
Pro Farmer (cash-only) 1.75 0.08 0.20 0.04 1.42 0.00 0.00 0.23 1.66
Pro Farmer (hedge) 1.72 0.08 0.20 0.04 1.40 0.06 0.02 0.26 1.69
Progressive Ag. 2.01 0.04 0.15 0.04 1.78 -0.14 0.01 0.31 1.93
Risk Management Group (options-only) 1.98 0.02 0.06 0.02 1.88 -0.07 0.05 0.22 1.98
Risk Management Group (futures & options) 1.98 0.02 0.06 0.02 1.88 -0.10 0.03 0.22 1.97
Risk Management Group (cash-only) 1.98 0.02 0.06 0.02 1.88 0.00 0.00 0.22 2.10
Stewart-Peterson Advisory Reports 2.00 0.04 0.12 0.03 1.81 -0.09 0.04 0.22 1.90
Stewart-Peterson Strictly Cash 1.96 0.05 0.12 0.02 1.76 0.00 0.00 0.19 1.95
Top Farmer Intelligence 1.99 0.05 0.14 0.03 1.78 0.12 0.03 0.23 2.10
Utterback Marketing Services 1.96 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.96 0.03 0.18 0.27 2.08
Descriptive Statistics:
  Average 1.92 0.03 0.10 0.03 1.76 0.05 0.02 0.23 2.02
  Median 1.96 0.03 0.12 0.03 1.79 0.00 0.01 0.24 2.07
  Minimum 1.72 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.40 -0.14 0.00 0.09 1.66
  Maximum 2.13 0.08 0.20 0.04 1.96 0.52 0.18 0.31 2.49
  Range 0.41 0.08 0.20 0.04 0.56 0.66 0.18 0.22 0.83
  Standard Deviation 0.11 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.14 0.14 0.04 0.05 0.16
Market Benchmark Price 1.99 0.03 0.09 0.02 1.85 0.00 0.00 0.20 2.05
Table 3.  Pricing Performance Results for 26 Market Advisory Programs, Corn, 1999 Crop Year
Notes:  Net cash sales price is calculated as (1) - (2) - (3) - (4). Net advisory price is calculated as (5) + (6) - (7) + (8), and therefore, is stated on a harvest equivalent 
basis. The market benchmark price also is stated on a harvest equivalent basis. LDP stands for loan deficiency payment and MLG stands for marketing loan gain. A star 
means that there is a positive actual brokerage charge, however it is rounded down to zero. The 1999 crop year is a two-year  marketing window from September 1998 
through August 2000.
 30(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Unadjusted Futures & Net
Cash Sales Interest  Storage Net Cash Options Brokerage LDP / Advisory
Market Advisory Program Price Costs Costs Sales Price Gain Costs MLG Price
Ag Line by Doane (cash-only) 4.82 0.12 0.17 4.52 0.00 0.00 0.93 5.45
Ag Line by Doane (hedge) 4.82 0.12 0.17 4.52 0.00 0.00 0.93 5.45
Ag Profit by Hjort Associates 4.77 0.18 0.19 4.40 0.00 0.00 0.94 5.34
Ag Resource 5.09 0.03 0.05 5.01 1.21 0.05 0.93 7.10
Ag Review 4.55 0.16 0.15 4.25 -0.49 0.01 0.93 4.68
Agri-Mark 4.66 0.00 0.00 4.66 0.05 0.03 0.91 5.60
Agri-Visor Aggressive Cash 4.54 0.00 0.00 4.54 0.00 0.00 0.94 5.48
Agri-Visor Aggressive Hedge 4.54 0.00 0.00 4.54 -0.08 0.01 0.94 5.40
Agri-Visor Basic Cash 4.54 0.00 0.00 4.54 0.00 0.00 0.94 5.48
Agri-Visor Basic Hedge 4.54 0.00 0.00 4.54 -0.08 0.01 0.94 5.40
Allendale (futures only) 4.57 0.04 0.13 4.40 0.39 0.01 0.86 5.64
Brock (cash-only) 5.07 0.14 0.16 4.77 0.00 0.00 0.91 5.68
Brock (hedge) 4.45 0.06 0.13 4.26 1.21 0.06 0.92 6.33
Cash Grain 5.30 0.15 0.16 4.99 0.00 0.00 1.00 5.99
Freese-Notis 4.83 0.13 0.16 4.53 -0.10 0.01 0.90 5.32
Pro Farmer (cash-only) 4.94 0.16 0.16 4.62 0.00 0.00 0.89 5.51
Pro Farmer (hedge) 4.66 0.18 0.20 4.28 0.68 0.03 0.89 5.81
Progressive Ag. 5.04 0.03 0.15 4.86 -0.16 0.02 1.00 5.68
Risk Management Group (options-only) 4.65 0.03 0.06 4.55 0.04 0.03 0.96 5.51
Risk Management Group (futures & options) 4.65 0.03 0.06 4.55 0.22 0.03 0.96 5.70
Risk Management Group (cash-only) 4.65 0.03 0.06 4.55 0.00 0.00 0.96 5.51
Stewart-Peterson Advisory Reports 4.90 0.07 0.09 4.73 0.37 0.08 0.96 6.00
Stewart-Peterson Strictly Cash 4.85 0.09 0.10 4.66 0.00 0.00 0.76 5.42
Top Farmer Intelligence 4.83 0.00 0.18 4.64 0.98 0.04 0.64 6.23
Utterback Marketing Services 4.30 0.00 0.00 4.30 1.15 0.20 0.90 6.14
Descriptive Statistics:
  Average 4.74 0.07 0.10 4.57 0.22 0.02 0.92 5.67
  Median 4.66 0.04 0.13 4.54 0.00 0.01 0.93 5.51
  Minimum 4.30 0.00 0.00 4.25 -0.49 0.00 0.64 4.68
  Maximum 5.30 0.18 0.20 5.01 1.21 0.20 1.00 7.10
  Range 1.00 0.18 0.20 0.76 1.70 0.20 0.36 2.42
  Standard Deviation 0.23 0.07 0.07 0.20 0.46 0.04 0.07 0.45
Market Benchmark Price 4.87 0.07 0.08 4.71 0.00 0.00 0.79 5.50
Table 4.  Pricing Performance Results for 25 Market Advisory Programs, Soybeans, 1999 Crop Year
---$/bushel---
Notes:  Net cash sales price is calculated as (1) - (2) - (3). Net advisory price is calculated as (4) + (5) - (6) + (7), and therefore, is stated on a harvest equivalent 
basis. The market benchmark price also is stated on a harvest equivalent basis. LDP stands for loan deficiency payment and MLG stands for marketing loan gain. The 
1999 crop year is a two-year marketing window from September 1998 through August 2000.
Carrying Charges
 31(1) (2) (3) (4)
Advisory Revenue Annual
Market Advisory Program Corn Soybeans 50/50 Advisory Revenue Cost of Service
---$/acre--- ---$/year---
Ag Line by Doane (cash-only) 328 267 298 300
Ag Line by Doane (hedge) 337 267 302 300
Ag Profit by Hjort Associates 299 261 280 280
Ag Resource 393 348 371 600
Ag Review 335 229 282 360
Agri-Mark 321 274 297 300
Agri-Visor Aggressive Cash 335 269 302 299
Agri-Visor Aggressive Hedge 314 265 289 299
Agri-Visor Basic Cash 332 269 300 299
Agri-Visor Basic Hedge 327 265 296 299
Allendale (futures only) 348 276 312 300
Brock (cash-only) 330 279 304 240
Brock (hedge) 320 310 315 240
Cash Grain 326 294 310 356
Freese-Notis 281 261 271 360
Pro Farmer (cash-only) 262 270 266 420
Pro Farmer (hedge) 267 285 276 420
Progressive Ag. 305 278 292 140
Risk Management Group (options-only) 312 270 291 500
Risk Management Group (futures & options) 311 279 295 500
Risk Management Group (cash-only) 332 270 301 500
Stewart-Peterson Advisory Reports 300 294 297 150
Stewart-Peterson Strictly Cash 308 266 287 99
Top Farmer Intelligence 331 305 318 180
Utterback Marketing Services 328 301 315 300
Descriptive Statistics:
  Average 319 278 299 322
  Median 326 270 297 300
  Minimum 262 229 266 99
  Maximum 393 348 371 600
  Range 132 119 105 501
  Standard Deviation 26 22 20 120
Market Benchmark Revenue 325 269 297
Table 5.  Revenue Performance Results for 25 Market Advisory Programs, Corn and  Soybeans, 
50/50 Advisory Revenue, 1999 Crop Year
Notes:  Advisory revenue per acre for corn (soybeans) is calculated as net advisory price times 158 (49) bushels. Market benchmark revenue 
per acre for corn (soybeans) is calculated as market benchmark price times 149 (49) bushels. 50/50 advisory revenue is calculated as (1) x 
0.5 + (2) x 0.5. Advisory revenue per acre and market benchmark revenue are stated on a harvest equivalent basis. The annual cost of a 
service is not subtracted from advisory revenue per acre. The 1999 crop year is a two-year marketing window from September 1998 through 
August 2000.
---$/acre---
 321995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Net Net Net Net Net
Advisory Advisory Advisory Advisory Advisory
Market Advisory Program Price Price Price Price Price
Ag Alert for Ontario N/A 2.47 N/A N/A N/A
Ag Line by Doane (cash-only) 3.15 2.65 2.33 2.22 2.08
Ag Line by Doane (hedge) N/A 2.61 2.29 2.32 2.13
Ag Profit by Hjort Associates 3.08 2.49 2.00 2.05 1.89
Ag Resource 3.90 3.12 2.07 2.21 2.49
Ag Review 2.59 2.76 2.57 2.25 2.12
Agri-Edge (cash-only) 3.07 2.62 N/A N/A N/A
Agri-Edge (hedge) 3.15 3.10 N/A N/A N/A
Agri-Mark 3.63 2.73 2.13 1.97 2.03
Agri-Visor Aggressive Cash 3.30 2.83 2.43 2.25 2.12
Agri-Visor Aggressive Hedge 3.10 2.58 2.41 2.05 1.99
Agri-Visor Basic Cash 2.72 2.65 2.34 2.16 2.10
Agri-Visor Basic Hedge 2.90 2.63 2.33 2.03 2.07
Allendale (futures & options) N/A 2.75 2.38 2.09 2.10
Allendale (futures only) 2.46 2.08 2.55 2.36 2.20
Brock (cash-only) 2.75 2.70 2.34 2.10 2.09
Brock (hedge) 2.29 2.39 2.64 2.40 2.03
Cash Grain N/A N/A N/A N/A 2.06
Freese-Notis 2.95 2.87 2.22 2.23 1.78
Grain Field Report 3.19 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Harris Weather/Elliott Advisory 3.16 2.28 N/A N/A N/A
North American Ag. 3.22 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Pro Farmer (cash-only) 3.16 2.64 2.19 2.09 1.66
Pro Farmer (hedge) 3.06 2.67 2.28 2.19 1.69
Progressive Ag. N/A 2.53 2.26 1.93 1.93
Prosperous Farmer 2.91 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Risk Management Group (options-only) N/A N/A N/A N/A 1.98
Risk Management Group (futures & options) N/A N/A N/A N/A 1.97
Risk Management Group (cash-only) N/A N/A N/A N/A 2.10
Stewart-Peterson Advisory Reports 2.90 2.46 2.09 2.02 1.90
Stewart-Peterson Strictly Cash 2.92 2.68 2.32 2.28 1.95
Top Farmer Intelligence 3.17 2.44 2.15 2.12 2.10
Utterback Marketing Services N/A N/A 2.74 2.51 2.08
Zwicker Cycle Letter 3.15 2.56 2.40 2.03 N/A
Descriptive Statistics:
  Average 3.03 2.63 2.32 2.17 2.02
  Median 3.08 2.64 2.33 2.16 2.07
  Minimum 2.29 2.08 2.00 1.93 1.66
  Maximum 3.90 3.12 2.74 2.51 2.49
  Range 1.61 1.04 0.74 0.58 0.83
  Standard Deviation 0.33 0.22 0.18 0.15 0.16
Market Benchmark Price 2.90 2.65 2.33 2.24 2.05
Notes:  N/A denotes "not applicable" -- program did not exist or was not evaluated for that marketing year. Net advisory price and 
market benchmark price are stated on a harvest equivalent basis. A crop year is a two-year marketing window from September of the 
year previous to harvest through August of the year after harvest.
Table 6.  Pricing Performance Results for Market Advisory Programs, Corn, 1995-1999 Crop 
Years
---$/bushel---
 331998-99 1997-99 1996-99 1995-99
Two-Year Three-Year Four-Year Five-Year
Market Advisory Program Average Average Average Average
Ag Alert for Ontario N/A N/A N/A N/A
Ag Line by Doane (cash-only) 2.15 2.21 2.32 2.49
Ag Line by Doane (hedge) 2.23 2.25 2.34 N/A
Ag Profit by Hjort Associates 1.97 1.98 2.11 2.30
Ag Resource 2.35 2.26 2.47 2.76
Ag Review 2.18 2.31 2.43 2.46
Agri-Edge (cash-only) N/A N/A N/A N/A
Agri-Edge (hedge) N/A N/A N/A N/A
Agri-Mark 2.00 2.04 2.21 2.50
Agri-Visor Aggressive Cash 2.19 2.27 2.41 2.59
Agri-Visor Aggressive Hedge 2.02 2.15 2.26 2.43
Agri-Visor Basic Cash 2.13 2.20 2.31 2.39
Agri-Visor Basic Hedge 2.05 2.14 2.27 2.39
Allendale (futures & options) 2.10 2.19 2.33 N/A
Allendale (futures only) 2.28 2.37 2.30 2.33
Brock (cash-only) 2.10 2.18 2.31 2.39
Brock (hedge) 2.21 2.36 2.36 2.35
Cash Grain N/A N/A N/A N/A
Freese-Notis 2.00 2.08 2.28 2.41
Grain Field Report N/A N/A N/A N/A
Harris Weather/Elliott Advisory N/A N/A N/A N/A
North American Ag. N/A N/A N/A N/A
Pro Farmer (cash-only) 1.87 1.98 2.14 2.35
Pro Farmer (hedge) 1.94 2.05 2.21 2.38
Progressive Ag. 1.93 2.04 2.16 N/A
Prosperous Farmer N/A N/A N/A N/A
Risk Management Group (options-only) N/A N/A N/A N/A
Risk Management Group (futures & options) N/A N/A N/A N/A
Risk Management Group (cash-only) N/A N/A N/A N/A
Stewart-Peterson Advisory Reports 1.96 2.00 2.12 2.27
Stewart-Peterson Strictly Cash 2.12 2.18 2.31 2.43
Top Farmer Intelligence 2.11 2.12 2.20 2.40
Utterback Marketing Services 2.29 2.44 N/A N/A
Zwicker Cycle Letter N/A N/A N/A N/A
Descriptive Statistics:
  Average 2.10 2.17 2.28 2.42
  Median 2.10 2.18 2.30 2.40
  Minimum 1.87 1.98 2.11 2.27
  Maximum 2.35 2.44 2.47 2.76
  Range 0.48 0.46 0.36 0.48
  Standard Deviation 0.13 0.13 0.10 0.11
Market Benchmark Price 2.15 2.21 2.32 2.43
Notes:  N/A denotes "not applicable" -- program did not exist or was not evaluated for that marketing year. Net 
advisory price and market benchmark price are stated on a harvest equivalent basis. A crop year is a two-year 
marketing window from September of the year previous to harvest through August of the year after harvest.
Table 7.  Pricing Performance Results for Market Advisory Programs, Corn, 
Two-Year, Three-Year, Four-Year and Five-Year Averages, 1995-1999 Crop 
Years
---$/bushel---
 341995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Net Net Net Net Net
Advisory Advisory Advisory Advisory Advisory
Market Advisory Program Price Price Price Price Price
Ag Alert for Ontario N/A 7.37 N/A N/A N/A
Ag Line by Doane (cash-only) 6.59 7.40 6.32 5.65 5.45
Ag Line by Doane (hedge) N/A N/A N/A 5.60 5.45
Ag Profit by Hjort Associates 6.78 7.13 6.16 5.26 5.34
Ag Resource 6.92 7.29 6.47 6.17 7.10
Ag Review 6.59 7.37 6.19 5.11 4.68
Agri-Edge (cash-only) 6.70 7.28 N/A N/A N/A
Agri-Edge (hedge) 6.62 7.18 N/A N/A N/A
Agri-Mark 7.94 7.18 6.68 5.71 5.60
Agri-Visor Aggressive Cash 6.38 7.28 6.33 5.55 5.48
Agri-Visor Aggressive Hedge 6.97 7.40 6.14 5.77 5.40
Agri-Visor Basic Cash 6.42 7.06 6.35 5.55 5.48
Agri-Visor Basic Hedge 6.78 7.46 6.14 5.79 5.40
Allendale (futures only) 6.21 7.30 6.67 5.90 5.64
Brock (cash-only) 6.27 7.20 6.31 5.65 5.68
Brock (hedge) 5.71 6.99 6.93 6.58 6.33
Cash Grain N/A N/A N/A N/A 5.99
Freese-Notis 6.41 7.13 6.15 5.81 5.32
Grain Field Report 6.84 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Harris Weather/Elliott Advisory 6.85 6.80 N/A N/A N/A
North American Ag. 6.44 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Pro Farmer (cash-only) 6.69 7.31 6.29 5.74 5.51
Pro Farmer (hedge) 6.78 7.49 6.47 5.85 5.81
Progressive Ag. N/A 7.80 6.65 5.71 5.68
Prosperous Farmer 6.52 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Risk Management Group (options-only) N/A N/A N/A N/A 5.51
Risk Management Group (futures & options) N/A N/A N/A N/A 5.70
Risk Management Group (cash-only) N/A N/A N/A N/A 5.51
Stewart-Peterson Advisory Reports 6.09 7.37 6.22 6.36 6.00
Stewart-Peterson Strictly Cash 6.28 7.13 6.33 5.96 5.42
Top Farmer Intelligence 6.20 6.84 6.08 6.32 6.23
Utterback Marketing Services N/A N/A 6.99 6.13 6.14
Zwicker Cycle Letter 6.89 7.67 6.59 5.76 N/A
Descriptive Statistics:
  Average 6.59 7.27 6.40 5.82 5.67
  Median 6.59 7.28 6.33 5.77 5.51
  Minimum 5.71 6.80 6.08 5.11 4.68
  Maximum 7.94 7.80 6.99 6.58 7.10
  Range 2.23 1.00 0.91 1.47 2.42
  Standard Deviation 0.41 0.23 0.26 0.34 0.45
Market Benchmark Price 6.26 7.08 6.30 5.86 5.50
Table 8.  Pricing Performance Results for Market Advisory Programs, Soybeans, 1995-1999 Crop 
Years
---$/bushel---
Notes:  N/A denotes "not applicable" -- program did not exist or was not evaluated for that marketing year. Net advisory price and 
market benchmark price are stated on a harvest equivalent basis. A crop year is a two-year marketing window from September of the year 
previous to harvest through August of the year after harvest.
 351998-99 1997-99 1996-99 1995-99
Two-Year Three-Year Four-Year Five-Year
Market Advisory Program Average Average Average Average
Ag Alert for Ontario N/A N/A N/A N/A
Ag Line by Doane (cash-only) 5.55 5.81 6.20 6.28
Ag Line by Doane (hedge) N/A N/A N/A N/A
Ag Profit by Hjort Associates 5.30 5.59 5.97 6.13
Ag Resource 6.64 6.58 6.76 6.79
Ag Review 4.89 5.33 5.84 5.99
Agri-Edge (cash-only) N/A N/A N/A N/A
Agri-Edge (hedge) N/A N/A N/A N/A
Agri-Mark 5.65 6.00 6.29 6.62
Agri-Visor Aggressive Cash 5.52 5.79 6.16 6.21
Agri-Visor Aggressive Hedge 5.58 5.77 6.18 6.34
Agri-Visor Basic Cash 5.52 5.79 6.11 6.17
Agri-Visor Basic Hedge 5.60 5.78 6.20 6.31
Allendale (futures only) 5.77 6.07 6.38 6.34
Brock (cash-only) 5.67 5.88 6.21 6.22
Brock (hedge) 6.45 6.61 6.71 6.51
Cash Grain N/A N/A N/A N/A
Freese-Notis 5.56 5.76 6.10 6.16
Grain Field Report N/A N/A N/A N/A
Harris Weather/Elliott Advisory N/A N/A N/A N/A
North American Ag. N/A N/A N/A N/A
Pro Farmer (cash-only) 5.62 5.85 6.21 6.31
Pro Farmer (hedge) 5.83 6.04 6.40 6.48
Progressive Ag. 5.70 6.01 6.46 N/A
Prosperous Farmer N/A N/A N/A N/A
Risk Management Group (options-only) N/A N/A N/A N/A
Risk Management Group (futures & options) N/A N/A N/A N/A
Risk Management Group (cash-only) N/A N/A N/A N/A
Stewart-Peterson Advisory Reports 6.18 6.19 6.49 6.41
Stewart-Peterson Strictly Cash 5.69 5.90 6.21 6.22
Top Farmer Intelligence 6.28 6.21 6.37 6.34
Utterback Marketing Services 6.14 6.42 N/A N/A
Zwicker Cycle Letter N/A N/A N/A N/A
Descriptive Statistics:
  Average 5.76 5.97 6.28 6.32
  Median 5.66 5.89 6.21 6.31
  Minimum 4.89 5.33 5.84 5.99
  Maximum 6.64 6.61 6.76 6.79
  Range 1.74 1.29 0.92 0.80
  Standard Deviation 0.40 0.32 0.23 0.19
Market Benchmark Price 5.68 5.89 6.18 6.20
Table 9.  Pricing Performance Results for Market Advisory Programs, Soybeans, 
Two-Year, Three-Year, Four-Year, and Five-Year Averages, 1995-1999 Crop Years
---$/bushel---
Notes:  N/A denotes "not applicable" -- program did not exist or was not evaluated for that marketing year. Net 
advisory price and market benchmark price are stated on a harvest equivalent basis. A crop year is a two-year marketing 
window from September of the year previous to harvest through August of the year after harvest.
 361995 1996 1997 1998 1999
50/50 50/50 50/50 50/50 50/50
Advisory Advisory Advisory Advisory Advisory
Market Advisory Program Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue
Ag Alert for Ontario N/A 359 N/A N/A N/A
Ag Line by Doane (cash-only) 326 374 310 304 298
Ag Line by Doane (hedge) N/A N/A N/A 310 302
Ag Profit by Hjort Associates 326 355 283 282 280
Ag Resource 377 407 295 316 371
Ag Review 292 382 324 293 282
Agri-Edge (cash-only) 323 369 N/A N/A N/A
Agri-Edge (hedge) 327 403 N/A N/A N/A
Agri-Mark 382 375 304 287 297
Agri-Visor Aggressive Cash 330 385 317 304 302
Agri-Visor Aggressive Hedge 331 369 311 294 289
Agri-Visor Basic Cash 297 366 311 297 300
Agri-Visor Basic Hedge 315 374 306 293 296
Allendale (futures only) 277 327 334 320 312
Brock (cash-only) 295 373 311 295 304
Brock (hedge) 256 344 346 340 315
Cash Grain N/A N/A N/A N/A 310
Freese-Notis 310 385 298 308 271
Grain Field Report 333 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Harris Weather/Elliott Advisory 332 331 N/A N/A N/A
North American Ag. 327 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Pro Farmer (cash-only) 329 371 300 296 266
Pro Farmer (hedge) 324 377 310 306 276
Progressive Ag. N/A 374 313 284 292
Prosperous Farmer 310 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Risk Management Group (options-only) N/A N/A N/A N/A 291
Risk Management Group (futures & options) N/A N/A N/A N/A 295
Risk Management Group (cash-only) N/A N/A N/A N/A 301
Stewart-Peterson Advisory Reports 301 358 291 306 297
Stewart-Peterson Strictly Cash 306 370 310 316 287
Top Farmer Intelligence 319 345 292 313 318
Utterback Marketing Services N/A N/A 354 337 315
Zwicker Cycle Letter 332 373 321 292 N/A
Descriptive Statistics:
  Average 319 369 311 304 299
  Median 324 372 310 304 297
  Minimum 256 327 283 282 266
  Maximum 382 407 354 340 371
  Range 127 80 71 58 105
  Standard Deviation 27 19 17 15 20
Market Benchmark Revenue 304 367 310 310 297
Table 10.  Revenue Performance Results for Market Advisory Programs, 1995-1999 Crop Years
---$/acre---
Notes:  N/A denotes "not applicable" -- program did not exist or was not evaluated for that marketing year. Net advisory price and market 
benchmark price are stated on a harvest equivalent basis. A crop year is a two-year marketing window from September of the year 
previous to harvest through August of the year after harvest.
 371998-99 1997-99 1996-99 1995-99
Two-Year Three-Year Four-Year Five-Year
Market Advisory Program Average Average Average Average
Ag Alert for Ontario N/A N/A N/A N/A
Ag Line by Doane (cash-only) 301 304 321 322
Ag Line by Doane (hedge) N/A N/A N/A N/A
Ag Profit by Hjort Associates 281 282 300 305
Ag Resource 343 327 347 353
Ag Review 287 300 320 315
Agri-Edge (cash-only) N/A N/A N/A N/A
Agri-Edge (hedge) N/A N/A N/A N/A
Agri-Mark 292 296 316 329
Agri-Visor Aggressive Cash 303 308 327 328
Agri-Visor Aggressive Hedge 292 298 316 319
Agri-Visor Basic Cash 299 303 319 314
Agri-Visor Basic Hedge 294 298 317 317
Allendale (futures only) 316 322 323 314
Brock (cash-only) 300 303 321 316
Brock (hedge) 328 334 336 320
Cash Grain N/A N/A N/A N/A
Freese-Notis 290 293 316 315
Grain Field Report N/A N/A N/A N/A
Harris Weather/Elliott Advisory N/A N/A N/A N/A
North American Ag. N/A N/A N/A N/A
Pro Farmer (cash-only) 281 287 308 312
Pro Farmer (hedge) 291 297 317 319
Progressive Ag. 288 296 315 N/A
Prosperous Farmer N/A N/A N/A N/A
Risk Management Group (options-only) N/A N/A N/A N/A
Risk Management Group (futures & options) N/A N/A N/A N/A
Risk Management Group (cash-only) N/A N/A N/A N/A
Stewart-Peterson Advisory Reports 302 298 313 310
Stewart-Peterson Strictly Cash 301 304 321 318
Top Farmer Intelligence 316 308 317 317
Utterback Marketing Services 326 335 N/A N/A
Zwicker Cycle Letter N/A N/A N/A N/A
Descriptive Statistics:
  Average 301 305 320 319
  Median 299 301 317 317
  Minimum 281 282 300 305
  Maximum 343 335 347 353
  Range 62 54 47 48
  Standard Deviation 16 14 10 10
Market Benchmark Revenue 304 306 321 318
Table 11.  Revenue Performance Results for Market Advisory Programs, Two-Year, Three-
Year, Four-Year, and Five-Year Averages, 1995-1999 Crop Years
---$/acre---
Notes:  N/A denotes "not applicable" -- program did not exist or was not evaluated for that marketing year. Net advisory price 
and market benchmark price are stated on a harvest equivalent basis. A crop year is a two-year marketing window from 
September of the year previous to harvest through August of the year after harvest.
 38Standard Standard
Average Deviation Average Deviation Standard
Net  of Net Net  of Net Deviation 
Advisory Advisory Advisory Advisory Average of
Market Advisory Program Price Price Price Price Revenue Revenue
Ag Line by Doane (cash-only) 2.49 0.43 6.28 0.78 322 31
Ag Profit by Hjort Associates 2.30 0.49 6.13 0.84 305 34
Ag Resource 2.76 0.75 6.79 0.46 353 46
Ag Review 2.46 0.26 5.99 1.10 315 41
Agri-Mark 2.50 0.70 6.62 0.99 329 46
Agri-Visor Aggressive Cash 2.59 0.48 6.21 0.74 328 34
Agri-Visor Aggressive Hedge 2.43 0.45 6.34 0.83 319 32
Agri-Visor Basic Cash 2.39 0.28 6.17 0.66 314 29
Agri-Visor Basic Hedge 2.39 0.37 6.31 0.82 317 33
Allendale (futures only) 2.33 0.19 6.34 0.66 314 22
Brock (cash-only) 2.39 0.32 6.22 0.63 316 33
Brock (hedge) 2.35 0.22 6.51 0.52 320 38
Freese-Notis 2.41 0.49 6.16 0.68 315 42
Pro Farmer (cash-only) 2.35 0.57 6.31 0.73 312 40
Pro Farmer (hedge) 2.38 0.52 6.48 0.70 319 37
Stewart-Peterson Advisory Reports 2.27 0.41 6.41 0.56 310 27
Stewart-Peterson Strictly Cash 2.43 0.38 6.22 0.62 318 31
Top Farmer Intelligence 2.40 0.46 6.34 0.29 317 19
Descriptive Statistics:
  Average 2.42 0.43 6.32 0.70 319 34
  Median 2.40 0.44 6.31 0.69 317 34
  Minimum 2.27 0.19 5.99 0.29 305 19
  Maximum 2.76 0.75 6.79 1.10 353 46
  Range 0.48 0.56 0.80 0.80 48 27
Market Benchmark 2.43 0.34 6.20 0.59 318 28
Table 12.  Five-Year Average and Standard Deviation for 18 Market Advisory Programs, Corn and Soybean Net 
Advisory Price and 50/50 Advisory Revenue, 1995-1999 Crop Years
Note:  Results are shown only for the 18 advisory programs included in all five years of the AgMAS corn and soybean 
evaluations. A crop year is a two-year window from September of the year previous to harvest through August of the year 
after harvest.
Corn Soybeans 50/50 Advisory Revenue
---$/bushel--- ---$/bushel--- ---$/acre---
 39Figure 1.  Central Illinois Crop Reporting District
 40Figure 2. Central Illinois Price Reporting District
 41Figure 3.  Loan Deficiency Payment (LDP) and Marketing Loan Gain (MLG) Rates for Corn and Soybeans, Central 
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 49Figure 12.  Pricing Performance and Risk of 18 Market Advisory Programs Relative to the 24-Month Market 
Benchmark, Corn, 1995-1999 Crop Years
Figure 11.  Average Net Advisory Price and Standard Deviation for 18 Advisory Programs, Corn, 1995-1999 
Crop Years








0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80







































































































































































































































































































































































 50Figure 13.  Average Net Advisory Price and Standard Deviation for 18 Advisory Programs, Soybeans, 1995-1999 
Crop Years
Figure 14.  Pricing Performance and Risk of 18 Advisory Programs Relative to the 24-Month Market 
Benchmark, Soybeans, 1995-1999 Crop Years
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 51Figure 16.  Pricing Performance and Risk of 18 Advisory Programs Relative to the 24-Month Market 
Benchmark, 50/50 Corn and Soybean Revenue, 1995-1999 Crop Years
Figure 15.  Average Net Advisory Revenue and Standard Deviation for 18 Advisory Programs, 50/50 Corn and 
Soybean Revenue, 1995-1999 Crop Years
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 52Figure 18 .  Pricing Performance and Risk of 18 Market Advisory Programs Relative to the 20-Month Market 
Benchmark, Soybeans, 1995-1999 Crop Years
Figure 17.  Pricing Performance and Risk of 18 Market Advisory Programs Relative to the 20-Month Market 
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 53Figure 19.  Pricing Performance and Risk of 18 Advisory Programs Relative to the 20-Month Market 
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